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Abstract 
The 1992 Czechoslovak mass-privatization program resembled a multiround Walrasian
auction with tatonnement in which participants, endowed with points, bid simultaneously
for non-uniform products. i.e., shares. The creation of this artificial primary market
provides economists with a unique opportunity to investigate empirically 1) the role of the
auctioneer in a politically-motivated giveaway scheme, 2) the price-setting mechanism,
and 3) the bidding strategies and rationality of the auction's participants. The paper 
analyzes the information content of the prices that emerged from the bidding process 
and considers the usefulness of the auction as a mechanism to reveal value. Unlike more 
conventional auctions, price discovery was only a secondary motive to the auctioneer 
in this case. The auctiorwer's principal aim was to transfer the shares quickly to the 
investing public in a politically acceptable manner. The evidence shows that the price­
updating rules adopted after each bidding round did achieve the auctioneer's principal 
aim. but also served to inj<•ct nois<>. The results suggest an inherent tradeoff between
socially acceptable outco111es in such auctions and efficient price discovery. 
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1 Introduction 
Privatization efforts in the former Soviet bloc differ markedly from those in advanced 
market economies, not only in scale but in process. The classic method of Western 
privatization, the public offering, is rarely used in Eastern .Europe because of 
underdeveloped capital markets, inadequate domestic savings, and the prohibitively high 
costs of taking thousands of companies to market Instead, to overcome these problems, to 
speed the pace of market reforms, and to build political support for private ownership, 
several governments have adopted voucher-based mass-privatization programs. This paper 
examines the first wave of voucher privatization in the former Czechoslovakia 
As Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny ( 1 994) discuss in their analysis of the Russian 
program, the justification for mass privatization is largely political. Indeed, the 
Czechoslovak government, in the information handbook it distributed to the general public 
during that country's voucher privatization, em phasized the need to break up the state's 
monopoly on employment and ownership as a precondition for the "democratic functioning 
of society" (Federal Ministry of Finance, 1992, p. 6). The principal advantage of mass, or
voucher, privatization. however, is that it gives a large cross-section of the population a 
sense of ownership in the economy and, therefore, a stake in economic reform. It builds 
political legitimacy for private ownership and helps overcome the tragic dual legacies of 
communism and the corrupt, spontaneous privatizations that plague countries in the early 
phases of their transition programs. 
Governments also offer economic rationales in support of mass privatization, but 
these arguments differ little from those of privatization programs elsewhere, namely, better 
managerial i ncent ive s, improved corporate governance, and budgetary relief for 
governments. Another potential economic advantage, sale proceeds to pay off a country's 
external debt or to fund social programs. is lacking in  m ass privatization because of the 
modes t  price that c itizens pay to participate. From an administrative point of view, 
however, voucher programs offer an important advantage over conventional forms of 
privatizatior:i. By sel l ing companies for vouchers, governments largely sidestep the 
valuation problems that plague privati1.ation in transition economies. Valuation is an easier 
task wi th voucher-based privatization than under a conventional approach because investors 
need only assess the cnti:rprises' rt'!atil•e val ues--i.e. , their values with respect to one
another--rather than having to e xpress al l c ompany va lues in m onetary terms.  
Governments can thus  avoid the cost and time d elays required to value thousands of 
companies under conditions of profounu pol itical and economic uncertainties and poorly 
developed capital markeLli. 
The Czechoslovak government's response to the challenge of transfen'ing assets with 
a book value of US$10.6 hil l ion to the country's c itizens was to organize an artificial 
primary market, centered on a 4uasi-Wal rasian auc tion with tatonnement, in which
participants,  endowed with points. hid simultaneously for shares in 1 ,49 1 companies over 
fi ve sequential rounds.  The demand for shares origi nated from two distinct groups, 
investment funds and individuals. and the dem and of each group was observable. The 
unique cross-sectional and time-series data that emerged from this auction allow one to 
study the price-formation process and the discovery of value in a market environment 
populated by informed investors and noise traders, and one in which price discovery is not 
the principal aim of the auction. 
The empirical evidence suggests that the auctioneer deliberately overpriced the shares 
in the interest .of absorbing points but would occasionally underprice to speed up the sale of 
the least-demanded securities. Mispricing provided the auctioneer a simple device to 
control the speed at which points were absorbed and assets transferred. The auction 
participants, especially the investment funds, responded rationally by seeking out 
underpriced securities. Except in the first round, when all companies were priced 
identically, demand largely reflected the reaction of investors to the noise injected into the 
auction by the auctioneer's idiosyncratic repricing rules. In later rounds, bidding be}J.avior 
can best be described as the search for mispriced securities. The result was the 
accumulation of non-uniform pricing eITors during the bidding rounds. 
This paper is organized as follows. The auction mechanism is discussed in section 2. 
An empirical profile of the participating firms and evidence on the outcome of the auction 
are presented in section 3. The price-updating rules are examined in section 4, followed by
participants' bidding strategies in section 5.  Finally, the information content of prices is 
analyzed in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2 The Czechoslovak privatization process 
2.1 The political environment
The privatization component of the government's reform program had three principal 
elements: Rep1ivatization. "small p1ivatization," and "large privatization." Reprivatization, 
or restitution, returned property that had been nationalized during the communist era.
Small privatization focused on shops, restauranL<;, and small businesses and was managed 
primarily through public auctions. 
All state enterprises not specifically excluded from p1ivatization or designated for sale 
in small privatization auctions wen: included in the large privatization program. Large
privatization was to occur in two "waves"--the first in 1 992 and the second in 1993. The
first wave, which is the focus of this pa�r. took place as scheduled. On January I, 1 993,
before the second wave could he implcmcnteJ. Czechoslovakia split into two sovereign
entities. Implementing their own Sl'l:onJ wan� was kft to the newly independent states; the
Cz.cch Republic implemented a sc�:onJ wave in 1994. 
2.2 The auction mechanism
2.2.1. The supply or shares
The supervising ministry of each cntaprise designated for inclusion in the first wave was
responsible for preparing a "hasic pnijc1:1," i.e . .  privatization plan, for the enterprise by the
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end of October 1 991 . 1 Other interested parties, including foreign investors, could submit 
their own plans, or "competing projects," by January 20, 1992. 
After the privatization projects were submitted to the supervising ministry, they were 
forwarded, with the ministry's recommendations, to one of the republic's privatization 
ministries or the federal Ministry of Finance, depending on which political entity--the 
Czech lands, Slovakia, or the federal state--was deemed to be the owner of that enterprise. 
These m inistries then decided which projects would be accepted. 2 The approval process is
summarized in Figure 1 . 
. Designers of piivatization projects could select from a menu of options, including 
direct sales to foreign or domestic investors, transfers of shares to local authorities, 
transfers to pension or health-care institutic_ms, and temporary retention by one of the three 
national property funds.3 Sales of shares to employees were allowed but only within tight 
limi ts. Companies also had to set aside at least 3 percent of the shares for a restitution 
fund. In all cases, voucher privatization was the default option. For example, if a plan 
called for 1 5  percent of a company's equity to be sold to a local investor and 25 percent to a 
foreign investor, and no other privatization option was chosen, after deducting 3 percent 
for restitution, the remaining 57 percent would be sold through the voucher program. The 
percentage of total equity privatized with vouchers would vary, therefore, from company to 
company. For Czech (Slovak) companies participating in the voucher program, about 62 
(74) percent of total company share capital was p1ivatized with vouchers. 
The voucher program in the first wave was managed by the federal Ministry of 
Finance's Center for Coupon Privatization (CPP). On May 13 ,  1992, the CPP published a 
'list of 1 .49 1 participating companies with share capital of about 300 billion korun, or 
approximately US$ 1 0.6 hil lion. With a nominal share value of 1 ,000 korun, the number 
of shares assigned to a part icular firm after its conversion into a joint-stock company 
depended on its total share capi t.al.4 
2.2.2 The endowments and the 11umeraire 
Participation in the voucher p1ivatization program was l imited to Czechoslovak citizens 1 8  
years or older and cost 1.035 korun :  35 korun for a voucher booklet and a 1 ,000-korun 
registration fee. or ahnu t US$35 . eq uivalent to the average weekl y  wage. Voucher 
registration took placc lx:twccn (ktnhcr 1 99 1  and Fchruary 1 992, and secondary trading
was strict ly forhidden. Thc vouchers. :.iltcmativc ly known as coupons. were denominated
in "points," rather th:.in korun.  hcc:.iusc o f  thc govi.:rnmcnt's wish to avoid the appearance 
of creating a suhstitutc curri.:nc y.� Each hookkt in the Czechoslovak program was valued
1 In practice, U1is task was nearly alway� dc.:kga1cd to enterprise management. 
2 OUler ministries might i111crvcnc for C11lll(l;U11c� with more than 3,000 employees or in cases calling for 
direct sales to private invc.-;ton. 
3 Each political entity--the C'1.cch Repuhlic. Ulc Slovak Republic, and U1e federal state--had a national 
property fund, t11e purpose of which wa.' 10 hold )\hare). of state enterprises after Uley were transfonncd into 
joint-stock companies and until tJ1c i.harc� c..'t>uld he soil.I through voucher auctions or by oilier means. 
4 For example, if a company hall �hare c:apua.1 of 5 million korun, it would have 5,000 shares. 
5 This policy is in direct c:ontr.L\I to the: Ru�sian prngrrun, in which each voucher had a face value of 10,00
rubles. 
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at 1,000 points and had to be registered with the government6 Of the 1 1  million eligible 
adults, nearly 8.6 million paiticipated.
2.2.3 The auction's participants 
Two d istinct groups participated in the auction--individuals and investment privatization 
funds (IPFs).  The IPFs were closed-end investment funds organized as joint-stock 
companies and registered with the federal Ministry of Finance. Some funds were set up by 
private individuals and companies; others by banks. Prior to round 1, an initial round 
known as round 0 gave individuals the opportunity to hand over their vouchers to the lPFs. 
Citizens could use some or all of their vouchers to buy shares of IPFs, which in turn, 
bought shares in the privatized companies. Two-thirds of the participants assigned all of 
their vouchers to IPFs. Many others assigned one or more vouchers to an investment fund 
but retained at least one voucher for personal use. In all, almost 72 percent of investment 
points were invested by IPFs. As noted by Kotrba and Svejnar (1993), the willingness of 
so many citizens to sign over their points to IPFs probably reflected their desire to d iversify 
portfolios and reduce iisk. 
The competition among these funds was intense, prompting some to offer guarantees 
of 10-,  and even 1 5-fold ,  eturns within a year after the issuance of shares. In effect, 
investors were granted a put option , with a strike price equal to 10 or 15 times the initial 
investment of 1 ,035 korun. The absence of a regulatory framework for investment funds 
rendered the government powerless to stop the funds from m aking such guarantees. 
Legislation to tighten the regulation of IPFs' activities was not passed until April 1 992, 
months after most funds had been establ ished. One important positive aspect of the funds' 
competi tive behavior. however, was that it greatly stimulated public interest in the program, 
resul ting in a part icipat ion rate roughly double what government officials had been 
expecting .  
Al though 439 I PFs were registered. the 1 4  largest, each of which had over 100 
m i l lion points. accounted for nearly 77 percent of the points assigned to investment funds 
and 55 percent of all voucher poinLli (Dlouhy and Mladek, 1 994). The single largest fund, 
run by the Czech Savings Bank. accumulated more th an 900 m ill ion points, or nearly 1 
mi l l ion voucher hooks. represen ting more than I 0 percent of the total points available to all
investors i n  the first wave. 7 
2.2.4. The bidding rounds and the timing of events
Auctions were organ ized i nto liw h1Jd ing  rounds. the first of which started in May 1 992.
The exact number of rounds was not known hc fore the first round, and the conduct and
terminat ion of the process was ldt to the d i scretion o f  the federal Ministry of Finance 
6 This requirement made it impo�sihlc for l<omeone to hid more than his or her endowment of points, or to
trade the points in secondary market!\. Foreigners could ohtain, hut not register, voucher booklets and, 
therefore, could not p<U1icipate 111 the au<:11on. 
7 Nine of the top fourteen inve�lment fumh W<.'re run hy hanks, and two by insurance companies. A 
peculiar feature of the Czcd10:.lovak voud11:r privatization scheme was the use of vouchers for privatization 
of major financial institutions that were at the s.une time active players in voucher privatization. 
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(Kotrba and Svejnar, 1993). An official announcement that round 5 would be the last was 
not made until after that round had been completed. Because it was widely known that all 
unused points would become void after the auction, the uncertainty resulting from the 
Ministry's discretionary powers exerted significant pressure on individuals and IPFs to bid 
early. 
By the end of round 5, in December 1992, 93 percent of available shares had been 
sold. The remaining 7 percent were held for future sale.s Leftover points could not be 
use.d for the second wave. �he first wave of voucher privatization officially ended in late
spring 1 993 with the distribution of shares to individuals and IPFs.9 The timing of key 
events is summarized in Table 1. 
2. 2. 5.  The role of the auctioneer and the auction's rules
In the first round, all shares were priced identically, 1 00 points for every 3 shares, or 30 
shares per booklet. Investors could use all 1 ,000 points to bid for 30 shares in a single 
com pany, 1 5  shares in two companies, 1 0  shares in three companies, etc. The starting 
price of 33.333 points per share was calculated from the total number of points, 8.6 billion,
divided by the number of available shares , 299.4 million, which corresponded to 299.4 
billion korun of share capital divided by the 1 ,000-korun nominal value per share, plus an 
overpricing factor of about 16 percent. In the subsequent rounds, prices were updated
using complex rules that were unknown to the auction's participants. 
The CPP processed the bidding information for each round and published the results, 
but the repricing task was performed by a special working group appointed by a deputy 
minister in the federal Ministry of Finance. This group (hereafter, "the auctioneer") 
submitted al ternative price-updating schemes after each round to a pricing committee 
com posed of the deputy minister and one representative from each republic 's privatization 
ministry. This committee then made the final decision.  
The al location of the shares in each round worked according to the fol lowing 
principles. When shares were undersubscribed, al l  investors who bid for those shares 
would receive them at that p1ice and any remaining shares would then be offered in the next 
bidding round. When shares were oversu bscribed by less than 25 percent, all bids from 
individual investors were fil led, with a pro rara reduction for the IPFs. In such cases, the
company was said to he "ful ly  suhscribed" and thus would not be available in later 
rounds.1° When shares were oversuhscribed by more than 25 percent, none of the shares 
were sold. Al l  points hid for those shares were then returned to investors, and the 
company went to the next round. The aucti oneer had the right in any round to exclude 
8 These shares coultl then he soltl directly 10 111,·ei.lor... noaletl on a public stock exchange, or distributed in 
the sccontl wave of voucher privatization. lntlL'Cd, 185 companies tJ1at participated in tJ1e first wave were 
also part of tJ1c second Czech Republic wa\'e <Dlouhy :uitl Mladek, 1994).
9 The process lasted 21 montlt'\, which acconJi11g to Dlouhy anti Mladek (1994), was a year longer than 
initially expected. 
10 Technically, this rule heltl only if !PF demantl tlid not have to be reduced by more than 20 percent 
Otherwise, the shares were tlL'Cmetl oversuh'.\crihctl anti all poinL� were returned LO the bidders. In other 
words, the shares woultl he trca1etl in tJ1e s:une manner a� tJ1ose tJrnt were oversubscribed by more than 25 
percent. 
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companies that were highly undersubscribed or with a market-clearing price in excess of 
1,000 points.11 
2.2.6. The inform ation set 
The information set available to partici pants included (I) the unobservable private 
information held by certain individuals and IPFs, (2) the public information on the 
companies before the start of the auction, and (3) the public information conveyed by the 
bids and reported by the auctioneer. Data for our empirical analysis were prepared by the 
C PP. and include all firms participating in the first wave of the voucher auctions. Data for 
each company were made public through a CPP publication that was widely available at 
newsstands and post offices around the country. The data included, for the period 1989 to
1991, sales, profits, number of employees, bank debts, total debts, and total assets, in
addition to company names, addresses, descriptions of business activity, identification 
numbers, shares offered, and allocation of non-coupon shares. 
The auctioneer publ ished the results of the auction after each bidding round. For 
each company, inf01mation was made available on aggregate demand, the split in demand 
between individuals and IPFs, the number of shares remaining, and the price for the next 
round .  
I I ll1e logic of this rule w;L, U1a1 any pnce greater Uian 1,000 points would make it impossible for an 
individual investor to ac4u1re a 1'han:. In prarnce, however, no companies were witJ1drawn from t11e auction 
for this rca.�on. 
· 
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3 Empirical evidence 
3.1 A profile of the participating firms
The auction included 1 ,491 firms, 988 firms in the Czech Republic and 503 in the Slovak 
Republic. Descriptive statistics for all firms are shown in Table 2.12 The accounting
variables are defined in Appendix 1. The INS variable at the top of the table is the ratio of 
the number of shares in the voucher program to the total number of shares. The median 
number of shares exceeded 70,000,. although a few companies had enough s hares 
outstanding .to pull the mean to 200,000, above the third quartile. Most  p articipating 
firms were small in comparison with publicly traded firms in Western markets. The median 
company had only 380 employees in 199 1 ,  although the presence of several firms with 
thousands of employees resulted in a considerably higher mean value, 9 1 6  employees. 
Sales revenues for most firms were modest, with a median of 122.3 million korun, or less 
than US$5 mill ion. The median Czech company was bigger than its Slovak counterpart, 
both in sales, 143.53 mil lion korun versus 80.56 million korun, and total assets, 1 1 9.9 1 
million korun versus 71.35 mil l ion korun. As measured by absolute levels, return on 
assets, and profit margin. Czech companies were also considerably m ore profitable than 
Slovak companies. A crude productiv i ty measure, profits per employee inn 199 1 ,  also 
shows that Czech companies achieved noticeably higher productivity. 
Sales and pro fi ts for the median Czech firm grew over the period--at annual rates of 
5 .82 percent for sales and 3 .20 percent for profits. Its Slovak counterpart experienced a 
decline in both vaiiabks, of-2.21 percent for sales and -16.60 percent for profits. Most 
companies in both republics reduced their work forces during this period, which indicates 
that firms undertook at kast some modest resu11cturing efforts before privatization. 
3.2 The auction results 
The auction was designed to transfer 300 m illion shares to investors endowed with 8 .6 
bi l l ion poinL'i. This section presents data on the price, demand, supply of shares, and 
number or poinL'i used in each of the five rounds. Both the unconditional and conditional 
cross- sectional distribu tions or these variables are given. A small set of conditioning 
variables includes t he subscr ipt ion status. i.e., whether a company was under- or
oversubscribed; nat iona l i ty , i.e . .  Ct.l'l'h or Slovak; and investor type, i.e., individual or
IPF. 
3.2.1. Prices
Two sets of p1ices are g iven : the priL·e poste<.l by the auctioneer after each round and the 
price paid by the auction's panicipanL'\, or the "transaction" price. The latter was equal to 
the former only for the fu l ly or unuersubscribeJ stocks because points were returned to 
l2 Although not presented here. the stati�tll'� were also segmented hy republic, Czech and Slovak.
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their owners when the stocks were oversubscribed by m ore than 25 percent. Summary 
statistics are given for both sets of p1ices in Table 3. 
Starting from a uniform price of 33.33 points per share, the unconditional 
distribution of posted prices becomes highly skewed after the first round. Because the 
mean is pulled by a few highly priced stocks, the median quoted price appears to be a more 
appropriate m.easure of central tendency than the mean price. The median price d isplays a
U-shaped pattern, that decreases after the first round to 14.29 points and reverts back to the 
initial price of 33.33 points in the last round; in contrast, the average price increases 
throughout the bidding rounds except in round 5. After the first round, a 40-fold 
difference between the cheapest stock, 10 points, and the m ost expensive, 400 points, is 
evident. The price range reaches nearly 1 ,000 points by the fourth round when the cheapest 
stock is priced at 1 . 17 points and the most expensive at 1 ,000 points. Prices take on a 
limited number of values, from a low of 20 after the first round to a high of 65 in the 
fourth, implying a large "tick" size (the difference between two adjacent ordered prices).13 
The cross-sectional disuibution of posted prices conditional on the subscription status 
is equal to the unconditional distribution of the prices paid by the auction's participants for 
the fully and undersubscribed stocks. Few differences are observed in the second round 
between the uncond itional and cond itional d istributions, but in rounds 3 through 5 ,  
participants bid aggressively for low-price stocks, which suggests widespread bargain 
hunting. The median price of the oversubscribed stocks is 4. 17,  6.25, and 1 1 . 1 1  points in 
rounds 3, 4, and 5 ,  respectively. In contrast, the median price of the fully and 
undersubscribed stocks. which corresponds to the price paid by investors, was 33.33 
points in the last three rounds. Except in the second round, the median transaction price is 
equal to the original '.B.11 points. 14 Pooling the fully and undersubscribed stocks results
in a loss of information. as panel C of Table 3 indicates. After round 1 ,  the median prices 
of the fully subscribed stocks, by round, are 14 .29, 16 .67 , 8 .33,  and 9.55 points, versus 
14.29. 50.00, 40.00. and 33.'.B for the undersubscribed stocks. Investors apparently 
started to bid aggressively for low-price stocks after the second round.15 
13 Czech compan ies comm;mded higher price� th;u1 Slo\'ak companies after the second round. After round 1, 
the median posted prices for Czech comp;mie., were 14.21J, 25.00, 25.00, and 33.33 points versus 14.29,
20.00, 20.00, and 25.00 pointi. for their Slovak 1.·ounterparLI\. 111e highest price fetched by a Czech stock 
wa" l.000 points, versus 800 points for a .Slovak i.to�:k. '1111.! lowest price was similar for Czech and 
Slovak Mocks. 
14 For fully and undcrsuh�mtx.-d Mode.,, the an:r.•!!e prke paid hy IPFs and individuals can he estimated by 
weighting tJ1c price by tJ1e n:sp.·1.:tl\·e numhcr of .Jian.·s hought. The rcsulling value-weighled average prices
paid hy IPfs were 49.8 1. 56.73. 37.77. ;111J 'o :!1J pomti. 111 rounds 2 tJ1rough 5. In contrast, tl1e weighted 
average prices paid hy indiviJuah wen: +i :! \, fii %, 57 .58 :u1d 5 1.33 poinls. 
15 In her empirical s1udy of the C1.cd1 m;L'-' pn vat11:11111n . .Shafik ( 1994) analyzes tl1e convergence of the 
price to ru1 cquilihrium and. using scuidarJ l'l·111111111etn1: techniques, such a� linear regression, the random­
walk property of prices. Shi.! l'Ondudl!s th:1t market i11f11nna1ion explains ahout 85 percent of the variation 
in prices by the final round.' :md tJiat prKc' UllTc:1l\lll!!IY tx:have like a random walk. Her analysis is based 
on the price posted hy tJ1e auc1ion1.-cr after each round. u� of the posled price has two major problems, 
however. first, tJ1at price i� a known tletem11n1Jt1c non-ltnear function of a limited number of variables, 
which makes using rcgrcs.,ions poinllc�' i:urtl1ennore. w; shown in tl1e repricing functions Umt were 
published afler the second mum!. pricl!i. wen: nm h:t-.cd on :my of tl1e variahles considered by Shafik. 
Second. the price posted hy IJ1e auctionl!er doci. not corrl!spond to tl1c price paid by the auction's 
participrull.s. As shown in Tahk J. major d1ffercncl!s exisl in tl1e cross-sectional and time-series 
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3.2.2. Relative dem and 
The unconditional and conditional distributions of relative demand, defined here as the ratio 
of the number of shares bid for in a given round to the number of shares available, are
reported in Table 4.  
As shown in panel A, the unconditional distribution is highly skewed, especially in 
the first round. The mean is pulled by a few shares with high demand.16 Also, about 400 
companies had relative demand less than 17 percent in the first round. Because of the 
asymmetry of the distribution, the mean and the median differ substantially. The average 
relative demand is greater than 1 .0 in the first three rounds and decreases monotonically 
from round 1 to round 5. The median is .less than 1.0 in all rounds, with an inverse U­
shape, increasing in the first three rounds and decreasing thereafter. Stocks were generall y  
undersubscribed and became even more s o  in  the later rounds. The m inimum and 
m aximum values for relative demand suggest that both deep over- and undersubscription 
persisted throughout the five rounds, but not necessarily for the same stocks. 
The cross-sectional disttibu tions of relative demand conditional on the subscription 
status are shown in panel B. A small number of stocks was fully subscribed in each 
round. By the end of the auction, 295 companies, about 20 percent of the total, had been 
fully su hscrihed . Throughout the auc tion, there were roughly twice as m any 
undersubscri hed than oversubscribed stocks. The number of oversubscribed stocks 
declined dramatically in the later rounds; in round 5, undersubscdbed stocks outnumbered 
oversubscribed stocks hy nearly 1 0  times. The median relative demand of the
undersuhscrihed stocks is under 0.50, whereas that of the oversubscribed stocks is above
2.00. Little evidence suggests that the conditional medians converge toward 1 .00 during 
the five bidding rounds. 
Panel C contains the dis tribut ion conditional on investor type. Two results emerge. 
First, the participation of I PFs peaked in the second round and decreased thereafter. 
Conversely , indiv iduals were Jess cager to hid i n  the first two rounds than in the later 
rounds. Second, the standard deviat ion or the individuals' relative demand is much higher 
than that of IPFs in every single round. The right tail of the distribution reveals the 
propensity of i ndi v iduals to hid up L'enai n stoL'ks. The left tail shows the IPFs' lack of 
interest in many stocks. The first quart ile is dose to zero in most rounds for IPFs, unlike 
what is observed for inc.Jivic.Jua ls . 
3.2.3. Points
In every round, the numher of poinL., L'onsumec.J hy i nvestors was less than the number of 
points bid. The d i ffercncc hctwecn the two variables is equal to the points returned to
investors for bidding in oversuhsnihcd stocks. The ratio of the number of points used to
distritrn1ions of the posted :uid tr.111�1l·111111 pnl'l'  in tJ1c M:cond, third, and fou1th rounds. As is standard in
the financial economics li1<:r.11urc. tJ1c tr.111�1l·1 1011 price should have been used 10 study t11e convergence to 
an equilihrium and tJ1c random-walk pmrx:ny. 
16 In one f:unous ca�e. a typographical emir rcsullcd in :ui extra zero heing added to the profits of a hotel. 
111e relative demruid for thii. stock al 1J1c end of tJic first round wa� 145. · 
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points bid provides infonnation about the clustering of bids among companies. The less 
clustered the bids, the greater the probability of undersubscription and the higher the ratio. 
Table 5 presents statistics on the aggregate number of points and the number of points
conditional on investor type, individuals or IPFs. 
· 
In the first round, the auction's participants bid nearly 8 billion points, or 93 percent 
of their initial endowment. About 5.6 billion points were returned, giving back to investors 
65 percent of their initial endowment before the second round. In the second round,
investors bid 4.9 billion points, or 87 percent of the total remaining points, of which 3.4 
billion points were used. The ratio of points used to points bid increases from 37.61 
percent in the first round to 69.89 percent in the second. The participants' bids were more 
clustered in the first round than in the second, which suggests that participants reacted 
differently to the change in posted pdces after the first round. 
After the second round, participants were left with 2.20 billion points, slightly less 
than 26 percent of the initial endowment. They bid 1 .99 billion points in the third round, 
about 90 percent of the total available, and used 1 .02 billion points. The decrease in the
ratio of points used to points bid, compared with the previous round, again suggests that 
bids were more highly clustered. This result is probably related to the bargain hunting 
documented previously. Only 1.18 billion points remained after round 3, 13.73 percent of
the in itial endowment. Participants bid 1.00 billion points in the fourth round, and used
only half of them. Finally, in  the last round, investors bid and used nearly all of their 
remaining points ,  92 percent. Less than 2 percent of the initial endowment of points was 
left after the last round. 
Pa1ticipants bid 85 to 93 percent of their initial or remaining endowments in each of
the five rounds, which suggests that they did not wait to accumulate information before 
bidding. IPFs bid mon: aggressively than individuals in the first two rounds. The ratios of 
the points bid to their n:spective endowments in the first two rounds are 95.6 1 percent and 
9 1 .2 2  percent for I PFs versus 83.74 percent and 77 .58 percent  for individuals. 
Furthermore, IPFs' bids in the first two rounds were less c lustered than those of
individuals, resulting in propo11ionately more points being returned to the latter. In other 
words, ind ividuals were more like ly to hid for companies that  were oversubscribed.
Consequently, individuals were left \vi th 'J7. I 7 percent of their initial endowment after the
first two rou nds versus 2 1 . 1 1  pcn:ent for IPFs. Finally, although IPFs control led 72
percent of all avai lahk poinL<;, IPF� and individuals had roughly the same number of  points 
left over after the third round.17 
3.2.4. The supply of shares 
17 In lJie first two rounds. C':t.l'Ch crnnpa111cs u11ractcd 80 percent and 83 percent of lJie points bid, even 
lllough Czech shares rcprc�ntcd jui-t 70 f'.'n.:i:nt of the total. The greater demand for Czech companies came 
primarily fmm IPFs. Co11s1stl'lll with Ul\.' cnd<.:nl·c on 1.:ontlitionaJ relative demand, lJ1e ratio of points used 
to points bid is higher for Slovak sttll'h. wlw.:h sugge:-.ts lhal Czech compm1ies were more likely lo be 
oversubscribed lllan their Slovak countcrparL,. ·n1c percentage of total points bid for Slovak companies
increased in lJie later round.,, whcrcw; tJ1c rauo of points used to points bid declined.
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The number of shares transferred to participants in a given round depended on both the 
number of points bid and the subscription status. No shares were transferred when stocks 
elicited no bids or when they were oversubscribed by m ore than 25 percent. The 
unconditional and conditional cross-sectional distributions are presented in Table 6. 
Panel A gives the unconditional distribution of the number of shares left before and 
after each round. The distribution is highly skewed, with the mean pul led by a few 
companies having a large number of shares remaining, including one company with nearly 
1 5  m il lion shares. The median number of shares available before the first round was 
7 1 ,301 .  After the first round, 90 mil lion shares were transferred, reducing the median to 
49,034 shares for the 1 ,443 remaining companies. Investors bought 75 million additional 
shares in the second round, fmther reducing the median to 30, 122 for the 1 ,370 remaining 
stocks. More than half of the shares available in the auction had already been transferred 
by the end of the second round. The pace then slowed, as investors bought 33, 37; and 41  
million shares i n  the final three rounds. After the last round, fewer than 22 million shares 
were left� sl ightly  less than 7 percent of the initial total; the median number of shares 
remain ing was 3 ,976. The number of shares transferred to investors is a U-shaped 
function, which peaks in the first round, bottoms out in the third, and increases slightly in  
the final two rounds. I 8 
As shown in panel B ,  s ignif icant differences are evident in  the distributions 
conditional on subsctiption status. For example, the median number of shares left over 
after the first round was nearly twice as high for undersubscribed stocks as for 
oversubscribed stocks, which i ndicates a preference for companies with relatively few 
shares outstanding. This preference was even stronger in round 2, but reversed in the third 
and subsequent rounds as participants turned to companies with many shares remaining. 
In the fourth round, oversubscribed stocks have a median number of shares four times 
higher than undersubscribed stocks. Also, the median number of shares remaining from 
the previous round is higher for fu l ly subscribed stocks than for either the under- or 
oversubsc1ibed group, which means that fully subsciibed companies were relatively large. 
The auction was an overwhelming success in terms of property transfen-ed and points 
absorbed. Yet the empirical evidence reported in th is section reveals intriguing results: (I) 
the large number of undersubscri hed com pan ies, especially in the later rounds, (2) the U­
shaped pattern of the median posted price , (3) the inverse U-shaped pattern of the median 
relati ve demand, which rema ins helow 1 .0 throughout the auction, and (4) in the th ird
round, bargain hunt ing and part ic ipants' new-found preferences for companies with a large 
numhcr of  shares remain i ng. A thorough understanding  of these results requ ires an 
analysis of the ptice-sctting mechan ism . 
4 The price-setting mechanism 
18 Although round 2 consumed the highe�l number of poinls, the greatest nwnber of shares was sold in 
round 1: 90 million shares were sold for 1 hill ion points in round I versus 77 million shares for 3.4 
billion points in round 2. 'Ille reason is that the average selling price increased from 33.33 points in round
I to 42.81 points in the following round.
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Before the first round, all companies were priced uniformly. After each round, the 
auctioneer updated prices for companies that were not fully subscribed. This section 
examines the information used by the auctioneer to update prices and the exact price­
updating rules, which are shown to be complex, non-linear furictions of the variables in the 
information set of investors. Appendix 3 describes the evolution of the price-updating 
rules during the five bidding rounds. 
4.1 The auctioneer's objective function
The auctioneer's principal goal was the quick transfer of assets in a politically acceptable 
manner, which called for minimizing the number of points and shares left after the final 
round. Price discovery was a secondary motive. To achieve the auctioneer's principal 
goal, the price-updating rules were designed to overpric e  the shares systematically,
although the degree of overpricing changed during the auction. This bias is in stark 
contrast to the underpricing normally observed for initial public offerings (IPOs), but 
comparisons between this auction and conventional IPOs can be misleading, partly because 
of the relative nature of asset valuation in the voucher program. Also, the auctioneer had a 
very different set of priorities from those of the typical IPO seller. The worst outcome for
the auctioneer was an oversubscribed stock because, in that case, no shares were 
transferred and all points were returned to the participants.19 As a result of first-round 
bidding. 90 million shares were sold to investors, nearly one-third of the total supply; 3 
billion points were absorbed by those shares. However, 5 billion points were returned to 
.investors. The auctioneer then manipulated the price, i.e., overpriced, to decrease the
probability of an oversubscription in the subsequent round. On the other hand, although 
overpricing was pervasive. the auctioneer occasionally underpriced to speed up the transfer
of shares in the least demanded companies. The mispiicing of secmities can be seen as an 
efficient way to control the speed at which assets would be transferred and points 
absorbed, a conjecture that is supported by empirical evidence. 
During two consecutive rounds, a stock could be undersubscribed twice, 
oversubscribed twice. under-. then oversubscribed, over-, then undersubscribed, over-, 
then fully subscribed, and finally under-, then fully subsciibed. Panel A of Table 7 gives 
the probability of observing each or these six outcomes in each round and pooled for the 
rounds. The low probability or observing two consecutive oversubscriptions is striking. 
In contrast, the probabi l i ty or two conse1.:utive undersubscriptions is high in almost every 
round.20 When pooh:d for all rounds. the prob:tbili ty of consecutive undersubscription is 
45 percent, reaching 61 perc:t:nt in the linal two rounds. A simple explanation is that a large
fraction of the assets had bt:en transferred and the auctioneer was soaking up the points 
that, in the later rounds, were m ostly in the hands of individuals.
19 Interestingly, one privati1 . .ation offa:iaJ dcfincd a su1.·1."Cssful hilklcr as an investor who received shares of 
an undersuhscrihcd stock: "In fact. IPF), invc:).ted more su�ccssfully than individuals; i.e., a larger percent of
individuals' points were rclumcd hccau:-.c lhl'y alloc:llcd t11em 10 oversuhscrihcd finns" (Krcmar, 1992). 
20 A notable exception is aflcr the second rounu. when Ilic auctioneer underpriced the least-demanded 
companies 10 speed up the tran:-.fer of :L'-'L'I:-.. Nol surprisingly, t11ese stocks were oversubscribed in Lhe 
Lhird round. 
· 
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Panel B of Table 7 shows, for all stocks that were not fully subscribed by the end of 
the auction, the number of times a stock was undersubscribed during the five bidding 
rounds. Out of the 1,196 remaining companies, 71 were undersubscribed five times, and 
693, four times. In contrast, no company was oversubscribed five times, and only 3 four 
times. Again, the systematic effmts of the auctioneer to overprice explains this striking 
asymmetry. 
4.2 The price-updating rules
The auctioneer's price-updating rules were deterministic functions of a small number of
variables and did not depend solely on relative demand in the previous round, as one would 
expect a priori. The price-updating rule in round j was based on four variables: (1) the
subscription status in the previous round, i.e., whether the stock was over- or · 
undersubscribed, (2) the relative demand in the previous round, Dj-l • (3) the number of
shares left, N s1_ 1, and 4) price level in the previous round, Pj-1; that is,
(1) 
where Rj is the ratio of the posted prices in roundsj andj-1, lrni-J < 1.0; is a dummy
variable that indicates the stock was undersubscribed in round j-1, and Fj(.) is a function 
specific to roundj. The shape of the function and comparative statics are discussed in the 
next section. 
4. 2. 1. Subscription status and relative demand
The dummy variable for subscription status determines to a large extent the shape of the
function and the va1iahles to he included in I.he function.
• Controlling for the price P1.1• the function Fj is linear with respect to relative
demand D1_1, for oversubscribed stocks:21
· 
Rj = a1 + b1 DJ· I· w ith j = 2,. .. ,5. (2) 
where, in most ca..�es. the slofX' h1 is e4ual to 1 .0.
• Controlling for the price P1.1 arH.J the numher of shares left in the previous round,
NS1_ 1, the price-updating ruk F1 is a non-linear function of relative demand in the
previous round D1.1 for 11mlrr.rnb.\·cri/Jrd stocks:
21 The function is not srricw un.w linear hut h:t' a kink, which rcsulLS in a lower slope for the most
highly ovcrsubscrihed stock.\. 'Ilic linear approximation is rca<;onable, however, given t11e limited number
of highly oversubscrihed s101.:ks. 
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l=m 
RJ = '"Iij,/ 1 ej,1 � Di_1< ej,l+I with j = 2, ... ,5. 
/=I 
(3) 
In Equation 3, Fj is a step function that talces on any of m different values, and
1 { . }  is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the relative demand in round j-1, D1_ 
1, talces on values in  the interval [j,b j,/+Il •  and equal to zero otherwise.
An example is given i n  Figure 2, which displays the price-updating rule after round 1 
(and before round 2). The different  functional forms for over- and undersubscribed stocks 
allowed the auctioneer to control and minimize the risk of having an undersubscribed stock 
becoming oversubscribed in the subsequent round. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the repricing factor R1, defined as the ratio of the
posted prices i n  rounds j and j- 1 ,  was not necessarily set higher than 1 .0 for 
oversubscribed stocks and less than 1 . 0  for undersubscribed stocks. In other words, 
prices were not necessari ly i ncreased for oversubscribed stocks or decreased for 
undersubscribed stocks. Table 8 classifies the stocks into 4 groups: 
• Group 1 :  Oversubscribed stocks i n  round j- 1 whose prices were increased, Rj > 
1 .00 .
• Group 2 :  Undcrsubscribed stocks in  round j- 1 whose prices were decreased, Rj < 
1 .00 .
• Group 3 :  Oversuhsc1ibed stocks in  round j- 1 whose prices were decreased, Rj :::; 
1 .00 .
• Group 4 :  Undcrsubscrihcd stocks i n  round j- 1 whose prices were increased, Rj 3
1 .00.
For each group, the median rcbtivc demand and the median repricing factor are also 
given. Two striking resu l ts emerge . First ,  few oversubscribed stocks had their prices 
decreased, whereas man y  undersuhscrihed stocks had their prices increased. The number 
of stocks in  group 4 is marginal ly smaller than that of group 2 when pooled for al l rounds, 
which means that almost h a l f  of the u ndcrsuhscri bed stocks had their prices i ncreased. 
Second, the blatant cm:rpric ing of umh.·rsuhscrihed stocks is observed mostly in the final 
two rounds. The rationah: for owrprfring the undersuhscribed stocks and for increasing
the dcgn:c of ove rpricing i n  the la1 1  ..·r rourllh wa� apparently to min imize the probabili ty of
ovcrsuhscription in thc �uhscqucni round and lu ahsorh as many poin ts as possible.
4.2.2. The num ber of shares outstan ding
As Equ ation l showed , thc pricc -upJ;.it ing ru les also depended on two other variables,
inc luding the number of shares rema in i ng . NS1. 1 • This variable was of greatest importance
to undersubscribed stocks, especial ly in the early rounds. After the first round, the median
number of shares for the I .4·D remain ing firms was 49,034, compared with 7 1 ,30 1 before
the auction. 
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After round 2, the median number of shares left for all remaining firms was 30,1 22, 
but was 67,453 for undersubscribed companies. The auctioneer then began to reprice 
undersubscribed stocks using the rectangular functions, shown in Figure 3, regardless of 
whether the companies had a small or large number of shares remaining. The first group, 
referred to as group 2.5 in Appendix 3,  comprises stocks with fewer than 1 1 ,000 shares 
left. The second group, group 2.6, comprises stocks with greater than 1 1 ,000 shares 
remaining that were undersubscribed in both rounds. For both groups, Fj is a rectang�l ar
function of both the relative demand in the previous round, Dj-1 ' and the number of shares
left •. NSj-l · Figure 3 displays the function for group 2.5.22
RJ = I,  L,bj, lj ,kj 1 < £1. 11 $; v1_ ,  < eJ. tr 1 )�( TJJ.k; � Ns1_ 1 < TJ;.kJ+ 1 ), with j = 2, . . . ,5 (4)lj kj 
where 1 { . )  i s  a dummy variable equal to 1 when the relative demand Dj-1 takes a value inthe interval [ £1,11 . ej, trd and the number of shares left NSj-l takes a value in the interval
[ TJ;.kj ' TJJ.k;+ i ]  and equal to zero otherwise. For group 2.5, the higher Dj- 1  and the lower
NS1_ 1 , the h igher the repricing factor Rj, which as Figure 3 indicates, can be given any of
four  values between 1 .00 and 4.00.  In other words, although the stocks were 
undersubscribed in round 2, their prices were increased by as much as 300 percent. For 
group 2.6, the repric ing factor Rj is given any of 8 values between 0. 16  and 0.75.
The rationale for pric ing the stocks in  group 2.5 remained the same as before: the 
auctioneer deliberately overpriced to absorb as many points as possible. The rationale 
d i ffered for the stocks in group 2.6. Because the stocks were undersubscr ibed in both 
rounds, the auctioneer was less concerned about absorbing points than transferring assets. 
The transfers were achieved by lowering prices, especially for the companies with many  
shares remaining. 
4 . 2 . 3 .  The price level
The dependence o f  t he price -updat ing ru le F1 on price i n  the previ ous round,  PJ- 1  • 
introduced a source of  noise that makes price i n  round j, P1, appear to be a random variable
when, in fac t. it was purdy determ in istic. An im portant problem faced by the auctioneer 
was that of the tick s izc .  <.lc li ned as the di fferem:e between two adjacent ordered prices.
The relative demand in a given round could take on any value greater than or equal to zero 
and was almost continuous; the prit·e could take on any value greater than zero and less 
than or equal to 1 ,000. In the fi rst round, the n:lativc demand took on 1 ,49 1 values, one 
for each company, with a low of 0.00.17 and a h igh of 1 45.40. For the second round,
however, the auctionecr postcc..l only 20 c..l i fferent prices, ranging from 1 0  to 400 poi n ts.
The tick size was an increasing function of the price, from a low of 1 point to a h igh of 100 
22 111crc was an exception, however. for the c.:ompan ie!-. with greater than 950,000 shares remaining. For 
t11is group, t11c pricc-up<lating rule i� a fu11r11on only of the number of shares left, regardless of relative 
dcmru1d in tl1e previous roum.I .  In suc.:h ca��. t11c repricing factor Rj was 0. 103.
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points. In subsequent rounds, the auctioneer increased the number of values that a price 
could take on, thereby reducing the tick size. The number of values that prices could take 
on increased from 20 in round 2 to 40, 65, and 57 in rounds 3, 4, and 5, respectively.23 A 
discrete, price-dependent tick introduced distortions, and the .severity of those distortions 
was greatest when the size of the tick was relatively high, as in the early rounds. 
Controlling for the number of shares left NSj-l •  the subscription status l {D·_ 
i<l .0} , and the relative demand DJ-1 • the repricing factor Rj differed for stocks with 
different prices. This fact stemmed from the reluctance of the auctioneer to multiply the 
number of prices that stocks could take on in the subsequent round. For example, three 
oversubscribed stocks in the second round with similar numbers of shares remaining and 
relative demands equal to 1 . 3 1  were given repricing factors of, respectively, 1 .00, 1 .25 , 
and 1 .30 based on second-round prices of 33.33, 20.00, and 1 1 . 1 1 . The high-price stock 
was thus underpriced by 30 percent relative to the low-price stock. Stated differently, 
relative demand had to be much higher for a high-price stock than for a low-price stock for 
the auctioneer to change the p1ice by the same proportion. 
4 .  3 A proxy for mispricing
We define a c rude but s imple proxy for mispricing, denoted by Mj, as the ratio of relative 
demand in round j, D1. to the repricing factor P1+11P1. A stock is assumed to be properly 
priced i f  Mi is 1 .0. For examp le , a stock that was oversubscribed by 50 percent, and
whose price was increased by 50 percent, is assumed to have been properly priced. 
Conversely, a company is assumed to be over- (under-) priced when the ratio Mi is less 
(higher) than 1 .0. For example, a stock with relative demand of 0.30 in round j but whose 
price decreased by only 50 percent in roundj+l  is assumed to have been overpriced.
The unconditional , cross-sectional d istribution of the mispricing proxy M1 for each 
round is presen ted i n  panel A of Ta ble 9. The mean and the median are less than 1 ,  
confinning  that stocks were general ly overpriced .  The amount of overp1icing decreased in 
round 3, when the auctioneer underp1iced companies with many shares left, but increased
sharply i n  the later rounds .  S i m i lar to the median relat ive- demand , overpricing is an 
inverse U -shaped funct io n .  Whe n one considers the distribution conditional on 
su bscript ion stat us, howe ver (pane ls B and  C),  a d i fferent picture emerges. 
Ovcrsuhscrihed stocks tended to he underpriced ,  whereas undersubscribed stocks were 
overpriced . Also, the degree of mispri1.:ing was asymcuic , being more i m portant for under­
than for ovcrsubscrihcd s to�:ks. 
Knowing the auct ioneer's o hkctive funct ion he l ps expla in  some of the resu lts 
reported in  the previous sect ion .  Rcl a t i ve demand increased as overpricing decreased .
Furthermore, the underpricing of undcrsuhscri hcd stocks in the third round explains the
switch in investors' prefere nces from compan ies with few shares outstanding to those with 
many shares. Fi n a l l y .  the s yste mat ic overpric ing explains why stocks were 
undcrsubscribcd and why the numher of undersu bscribed stocks dramatically increased in 
23Prices above 100 points were i.clccteJ Ml a., 10 he ca.';ily divisible in to 1,000, partly because voucher
booklets were di vided inlO 1 00-point scctioni.. 
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the l ater rounds. These results suggest that investors were rational, in that they bid 
aggressively for underpliced secmities and generally avoided those that were overpriced. 
5 Bidding strategies 
Prior to the first round, individuals and IPFs had both private and public information on the 
companies' characteristics. After each new round, the information set expanded. The 
auctioneer revealed the relative demand in the previous round, the number of shares bought 
in the previous round (and thus the number of shares remaining for subsequent rounds), 
and the number of shares purchased by individuals versus IPFs and then posted a new 
price.24 We next examine the participants' bidding strategies in light of this information
set. Because all companies were p1iced identically at the start of the auction, we analyze 
round 1 separately from the others. 
5.1 The participants '  bids in the first round
In addressing the determ inants of  relative demand, we consider a set of accounting 
variables that includes the measures of profitability, growth, and risk defined in Appendix 
1 ,  a dummy variable for national ity (Czech or Slovak), industry dummy variables (see 
Appendix 2), and a variable that measures the percentage of a company's equity that was 
distributed through the voucher auction. 
Because of the explorato1y nature of our investigation, we used a stepwise selection 
technique for logistic and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Specifically, we used 
the logistic regression based on iteratively reweighted least squares to find the "best" subset 
of variables. We then used OLS regressions to analyze the determinants of the relative 
demand of individuals and IPFs.2s 
The resu l ts arc rl!ported in Table 1 0. The subset of variables retained by the 
stepwise procedure for the log istic regressions correctly c lassifies the oversubscribed 
stocks in 87.3 percent of the cases. More importantly, despi te their high number, only
1 2.5 percent of the undersubscri bl!d stocks are misclassified. This resul t  suggests that 
panicipanL� used the public inf 01matinn contained in the accounting vruiables before placing 
their bids. The subset of vari ab les includes two industry dummies and seven other 
24 The value of private infonnatio11 ruid tlu: optimal t iming of U1e placemen t  of bids--in particular who
should bid in the first round--arc not addn:s'-1.'U hen:. It is not obvious that private infonnation had the 
greatest value in U1e firxt rounu when all �:ompany shares were offered for the same price, as Shafi.k ( 1 994) 
conjectures. Mru1ipulat ive bius could ha\'e tx.·cn placed to mini mize the revelation of private infonnation.
The likel ihood of manipulat i \'e bids w;t, l 1 1ni 1cd by tlH.: uncertainty regarding certain rules of the auction, 
however, which included ( I )  U1e aucliorll.w\ pril-c-upU;11ing rules (for example, a stock is undersubscribed
and yet i L'i price is inlTClLl\Cd), (2 )  the exac1 numtx:r of rounds, mid (3) the subscription status (for example, a 
stock wa.'> declared fu lly subscritx:<l even whcn the excess demand is higher Uum 25 percent, or a stock was 
or wa" not withdrawn from Ilic auction when the demand was very smal l). The republicru1 privatization
m inistries anti the federal M inistry of r:ina1K·c dcddcd after each round on tl1e price-updating rules for the
subsequent round ru1d which stocks woulu he: available for tliat round. Such an uncertain environment was
not favorable to U1e placement of manipulati \'C bius. 
25 We also exrunined Ute i ndustry preferences of investors, botl1 i ndi viduals and IPFs. Results are available
on request . 
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variables, all but one of which are accounting based. All regression coefficients have the 
expected signs. The two industry dummies--for sectors 3 and 8 ,  light industry and
banking and insurance--have positive signs, which is consistent with the evidence reported 
here. The relevant accounting variables are (1) two measures of profitability, ROA and 
level of profits, (2) sales growth for 1989 to 1991, (3) two measures of financial risk, total 
debt and total leverage, and (4) a measure of size, the number of employees, which enters 
with a negative sign. 
One of the most significant variables in the regressions is the ratio of the number of 
shar�s available i n  the voucher auction to the total n umber of shares. The negative
coefficient suggests that the l ower the ratio, the higher the probability of the stock being 
oversubscribed. The shares not avai lable in the auction included prior commitments to 
foreign and domestic investors; thus the ratio may have acted as a quality signal. The 
higher the number of shares bought by private investors, domestic or foreign, the lower the 
ratio and the higher the qual i ty of the film. There is evidence of participants free riding on
these private i nvestors by heavily demanding shares in those companies deemed attractive 
by the latter. 
The OLS regressions were used to identify the determinants of the relative demand of 
individuals and IPFs. Table l 0 shows that both groups bid up the prices of companies
with few shares outstanding and, especially the IPFs, those companies with a low ratio of 
the number of shares available in the voucher program to the total number of shares. The 
IPFs were the primary users of the s ignal conveyed by the domestic and foreign prior 
commitments. 
Other interesting differences are found in the demand of the i ndividual and IPF 
investors. The R2 of the regression is significantly higher for IPFs than for individuals
(0.456 versus 0.300). Few accounting variables are retained by the stepwise procedure to
explain the relative de mand of ind iv iduals, which suggests that IPFs were better at 
exploit i ng the i nformation in the accounting variables. IPFs focused on profi tability,  
growth . and risk . Individ uals were more concerned with size, as measured by total assets 
and by the n umber of shares ava ilable before the auction. Individuals bid up the prices of 
compan ies with h igh asseLo;; but few shares outstanding. 
5.2 Bidding strategies after round I 
In attempting lo iden t i fy the variahks used by part ic ipants to bid on secu ri ties. we
considered a logical start ing point w he the three variables that entered the auctioneer's
price-updating rules. The first v;.iriahle is the aggregate relative demand in the previous
round D1. and relative demand segrm:nted hy hidder type, INDj and IPF)' The number of
shares left after the previous mund. NS/' · is the second variable, and price in  the previous
round, P1• is the third.
The condit ioning variables were ranked from low, group 1 ,  to high ,  and 1 0  or 1 2  
groups of equal size were fo1med.  For each group, the median value of the conditioning
variable, the median rdativc demand D1+ / •  in the aggregate and spl it into types, INDj+l and
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IPF}+1' in the subsequent round, are reported. A non-parametric statistic was used to test 
the equality of the location parameter across groups. 
5 .  2 . 1 .  The relative demand conditional on past relative dem and
To test the possibility that investors bid more or less aggressively for companies whose 
prices were bid up or down in the previous round, we formed groups according to relative 
demand and subscription status. The relative demand in round j was split into 1 2  groups. 
The first (last) 6 groups of equal size include under- (over-) subscribed stocks with relative 
demand ordered from low (group 1 )  to high (group 1 2). The results are reported in Table
1 1 . 
Two results stand out. Relative demand is a monotonically decreasing function of 
relative demand in the previous round only for round 3. This fact stems from the decrease 
in the posted price of com panies wi th many shares outstanding that had received l ittle 
interest in the earlier rounds, which triggered the bargain hunting described earlier. In all 
other rounds, a strange pattern emerges. The median relative demand in round j+ 1 is a U­
shaped function of the med ian relat ive demand in round j. · The peak coincides with the 
least undersubscribed stocks in the previous round. Investors bid more aggressively for 
moderately undersubscri hed stocks, perhaps because investors considered the price of 
these stocks to he c losest to their equ i l ibrium values and the companies thus to have the 
highest probabi l i ty of being ful ly subscribed in the subsequent round. 
Another i mportant issue is that of mimick ing bids. Less sophisticated investors, 
(here, individuals), can he expected to mimic the bids of more informed and experienced 
investors (here, the IPFs). To test for such behavior, we studied the relative demand in 
round j+ 1 for each of the two investor types condi tional on both ( 1 )  its own past relative 
demand and (2) the pa.st relative demand of the other investor group. Each variable was 
split into 10 groups of equal s ize from low (group 1 )  to high (group 1 0) ,  or 1 00 groups in 
al l .  The num ber of observations and the median subsequent relative demand are reported 
for each group for round 2 in Ta hie 12 .  �<· 
The last column (row) in Ta hie 12 g i ves the median relative demand of individuals
cond itional on their ( IPFs') relat i n: dt:mand in the previous round . Confirming earl ier 
evidence, a U-shaped pat tern is ohst:rved. Also, the relative demand of ind iv iduals 
displays lit tle sensi t iv i ty to e i ther of  the two cond i t ioning variables. If the last row and 
column of the matrix are cxc luth:d , thl.' evidence on the mimicking-bid hypothesis is mixed.
The re lative demand or i nd i vidua b. is low when the demand of IPFs was low in the
previous round . Some i:vidence e x ists. however, that the relative demand of ind ividuals 
was low when the demand or lPFs wa.s high.  lml iv iduals apparently d id not interpret the
signal conveyed hy the I PFs' hids un i formly across stocks. The results suggest that any
signals sent by the b idd i ng behavior of IPFs may have in fluenced individuals' bidding 
strategies for low-value hut not h igh-value rnm panies. 
5 . 2 . 2 . The relativ e  demand conditional on the number of shares left 
26 ResulL� for Ll1c otJ1cr rounds arc availahlc on rc4ucsl.
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We found evidence of strong demand, especially from individuals, for companies with few 
shares available in the first round. The auctioneer responded by disproportionately 
increasing the price of those companies. The results, reported in Table 1 3, with group I 
(10) containing companies with few (many) shares outstanding, confirm that individuals 
continued to bid aggressively for companies with few shares remaining in round 2 despite 
the overpricin�. No such effect is observed for IPFs. Participants' preferences changed in 
round 3, however. IPFs and, to a lesser extent, individuals went after companies with 
many shares outstanding, which apparently stemmed from the deliberate underpricing of 
those stocks by the auctioneer. The median relative demand of IPFs monotonically 
increases with the number of shares, especially in the later rounds. No such pattern is 
observed for individuals, which suggests that IPFs were better able to detect mispriced 
securities. 
5 .  2 .  3 .  The relative demand conditional on price
Table 1 4  reports on individual and IPF relative demand conditional on price. For round 2, 
20 groups were formed corresponding to each of the 20 different prices posted by the 
auctioneer at the beginning of the round. (For subsequent rounds, we report only those 
groups with a p1ice of 200 points or less .) One striking result that emerges from this table 
is the low relat ive demand among both IPFs and i ndividuals for high-price stocks in all 
rounds. Th is result is not surpiising for individuals, who most likely tried to maximize the 
number of shares they couid acquire with their 1 ,000-point endowment. The result i s  more 
d i fficult to expla in for IPFs, unkss high-price stocks were systematically overpriced. 
Also, an almost monotonic inverse relationship exists between relative demand and price in 
the later rounds. · Investors b id more aggressively for the lowest price stocks, which in 
turn , corresponded to the companies with many shares outstanding. In the second and 
thi rd rounds, the relationship between price and relative demand is U-shaped for both IPFs 
and individuals. Investors preferred low-piice stocks but not the lowest p1ice stocks.27 
5.3 The rationalit)' of participants ' bidding strategies 
Oversubscribed stocks tended Lo he s l i gh t l y  undcrpriced , and undersubscri bed stocks 
severe ly  overpriced .  Furthermore . the prices of many undersubscri bed stocks were 
actual ly incn!ased. especia l ly in till' lata rounds. and conversely. prices were reduced for a 
few oversubscribed s to�:ks. I n  this Sl'l' t ion. we report the bidding strategies of individuals 
and I PFs in the presem:e of misp1il'eJ sernrit ies. The purposes are to dctennine whether or
not investors hid up (down) the pri l·l· uf under- ( over-) priced stocks and to d iscover any
evidence of learning during the round.-. . 
Part icipants' bidding strJte)_!ll's \h' re  studied hy relating relative demand Dj+l to the
proxy for mispricing Ml' de fined a' the rat io  of re lative demand in round } to the repricing
27 An i nteresting cx:unplc i� pro\'iucu hy the �uh:-.ct of i.iocks priced at 150 points afLer the firsL round
whose price ww; arh i trari ly dc'-·re:L-.cu to IOO fl\ l int:- or inncased to 200 poinL<> Lo allow price to he easily
divisihlc into 1,000. The aul·t um\ panil:1pa111.-. immed ia tely spoiled t11c inefficiency and bid aggressively
for Uie I 00-point companiei.. 
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factor Rj. Both variables were part of the public information set before bidding in round 
j+ 1 .  Unconditional tests were perf01med in addition to tests conditional on the subscription 
status and on a dummy variable that can take on any one of four values depending on 
whether the stock was over- (under-) subscribed in round j and. the price was subsequently 
increased or decreased. 
Table 1 5  presents, for each round, the median relative demand Dj, the repricing factor 
�· the m ispricing factor Mj, and relative demand Dj+I•  both pooled across participants and
segmented for individuals and institutions, INDj+l and IPFj+ l · . Panel A shows the 
unconditional median, and panel B ,  the median conditional on . .  subscription status: The 
results show that ( 1 )  relative demand was highest in round 3, when a large group of stocks 
was underpriced, (2) except in round 3, relative demand was higher for stocks that had 
been oversubscribed in the previous round,  and (3) IPFs had a clear preference for 
oversubscribed stocks, which suggests superior ability in detecting underpriced securities. 
More revealing tests were performed by sorting the mispricing measure Mj into
deciles. Values below (above) 1 .0 are evidence of overpricing (underpricing). Table 16 
gives the median value for Mj, the subsequent median aggregate relative demand in round
j+ l ,  Dj+1 •  and demand segmented for individuals and institutions, INDj+l and IPFj+l·  We
used a non-parametric median score statistic to test whether the distribution of relative 
demand has the same location parameter across groups. The null hypothesis of the equality 
of median relative demand in round j + 1 across groups is strongly rejected both for the
IPFs and ind i viduals. Evidence is c lear that the median relative demand increases with Mj 
but in a non-monotonic fashion. The supe1ior ability of IPFs to detect mispriced securities 
is confirmed here; they h:.ird ly bid at :.i l l  for the most overpriced stocks but bid aggressively 
for those that  were umkrpriced .  In the fi nal two rounds, IPFs used their remaining 
endowment of points, less than 6 percent of the original amount, to buy deeply underpriced 
stocks. As for individuals. demand was usual l y  lowest for the most overpriced stocks, but 
the association between the med ian m isp1icing measure Mj and median relative demand is
m uch weaker. Furthermore, there is l i tt le evidence of learning by individuals during the 
rounds. 
Another way to study the rat ionality or  investors is to dete1mine the extent to which 
the m ispric ing measure M1 can predict  su bscription status, i. e. , whether a stock wil l be
under- or oversubscrihed in the su bseq ue nt round.  To exam i ne this issue, we used a 
logistic regression wi th Lhe fol lowing cxpl:.inatory va1iables: the mispricing measure Mj, the
numher of shares left hdo� the round NSJ' and the price level i n  round j, Pj. The last two
variahlcs were included to determine any investor prdcrences for stocks wi th few or many 
shares outstanding and with a low or h ig h price . after conu·ol ling for mispricing. 
The regression equation is 
i=4 1 = 4  1 = 4  1 = 4 
1 n1+ l > l .O = L aj.j + z)3 ,/.11 + I Y,JPJ + I 8i,jNSj + ej. with j = 2, . . .  , 5 , (5)
1 =1 1 = 1  1 =  I 1 = 1 
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where the four intercept and slope dummies correspond to the four groups defined in 
section 4.2. 1 .28 The dependent variable is the probability that the stock is oversubscribed 
in the next round. The results are reported in Table 17  ,29 
As reported in section 5. 1 ,  the best model for predicting which stocks would be
oversubscribed in the first round correctly classified 87.3 percent of the oversubscribed 
stocks and misclassified 12.5 percent of the undersubscribed stocks. For the third round, 
however, a model based only on the three right-side variables in Equation 5 properly 
classified 93 percent of the oversubscribed stocks; only 6.8 percent of the undersubscribed 
stocks were incorrectly classified. The percentage of correctly classified companies 
deteriorates in the final two rounds, which may reflect the increased participation of noise 
traders (i. e. , individuals).
As predicted, the coefficients i.J associated with the mispricing have positive signs.
Unl ike ZJ• the coefficient I .J• is not always statistically significant, which is not surprising
given the asymmetry between the deep overpricing of undersubscribed stocks and the· 
modest underpdcing of oversubsciibed stocks. The regression coefficient 4,j is statistically
sign ificant for the group of undersubscribed stocks whose prices were increased. The 
coefficients associated with the price level ,  iJ• are generally insignificant, especially for the
oversubscribed stocks. The pdce level in  round j becomes ilrnlevant for predicting which 
stocks will be oversubscribed, except for those in group 4. The regression coefficient 4J is
negative, which means that investors, mostly individuals, bought overpriced stocks. but 
principally those with relatively low p1ices. Finally, evidence that the number of shares left 
stil l  mattered is weak. Most i,j coefficients are negative, which suggests a preference for
stocks wi th few shares outstand ing ;  the exception is I .J after the second round, but the
coefficient is statistical ly significan t in only a few cases. 
The results obtained from the logistic regression suggest that the mispricing measure 
M1 is a good predictor of subscription status in the subsequent round.  Investors, especially
IPFs. bid up (down) the price of under- (over-) priced stocks. Other variables, such as 
price level and the number of shares outstanding. apparently mattered l i ttle. I n  summary, 
the empirical evidence suggests that demand was driven by �undamentals in the first round
and by the search for u ndcrpriced or the least overpriced securities in subsequent rounds
and that IPFs were mon.: rational i n vestors than individuals . 
6 The information content of prices 
As Milgrom and Wdx:r ( 1 982 ) arg uc. throu g h  the bids of the participants ,  auctions reveal
useful information ubout Lhe und1..·rl ymg va luc  or fi rms. This info11T1ation can fac i l i tate the
emergence -of fin ancial  markets a.'\ future inves tors become informed about the value of
newly privatized firms. Jn  th is s1..·1.·tion, we examine the information content of prices to
28 111c cocfficicnL� of tl1c tl1inJ group couh..1 1101 alway:-. he cs1imatctl because of t11e small sample size.
29 S imilar OLS regression:-. were pcrfonrn:u 111 which 1llc tlcpcntlcn1 variable was tl1e relative demand of
intlivitluals anti J PFs. Rc:.u l l:-. arc avaHahlt: 011 n:quc:-.l. Logis1ic regressions could nol be run for tlle 
segmented tlemantl bccam.c a :-.rock's un1..ll:r· or ovcrsu b!\cribctl status could be tlelennined only from aggregate 
tlcm.m1tl. 
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9etermine whether they provide reliable signals about the (relative) values of companies. 
As discussed earlier, the auctioneer deliberately mispriced securities to absorb points and 
speed up the transfer of assets. The price-updating rules adopted by the auctioneer thus 
depended on more than simply relative demand and included such variables as the number 
of shares outstanding and tick size. Because investors generally responded rationally to the 
auctioneer's deliberate mispricing, the practical effect of the auctioneer's repricing  policy 
was to i nject n oise. Furthermore, because the auctioneer systematicall y  overpriced 
securities, mispricing accumulated during the five bidding rounds. This bias would not be 
a concern i n  revealing value if the mispricing was uniform across securities. In this  
auction, however, mispricing was not uniform and, moreover, changed i n  the course of the 
auction because the price-updating rules were modified after each round. 
6.1 The "surviving" stocks 
In examining the information content of the price i n  round  5, we first consider the 
relationship between the price in round 5 and relative demand i n  round 1 ,  because only i n  
that round did demand appear to be d1iven piimarily b y  measures of fundamental value. In 
subsequent rounds, demand was driven mostly by the search for mispriced securities. The 
price in the final round should be correlated with relative demand i n  the first round unless 
price is buried in the noise introduced by the auctioneer. 
Table 1 8  shows the number of companies and the median p1ice in round 5 for each of 
1 00 groups formed accord ing to relative demand in  round 1 and the number of shares 
ou tstanding before round 1 .  Relative demand was segmented into over- and
undersubscribed stocks, with five groups of equal size created for both groups. The same 
procedure was fol lowed to generate l 0 groups of equal size, formed accord ing to the 
number of shares outstanding before round I .  The last column of the matrix d isplays the
median price conditional on subsc1iption status and relative demand. The median price 
increases with relative demand but not monotonically. The lowest (highest) median price is 
5.88 ( 1 75.C>O) poinL<;. The price of the least-undersubscribed stock is h igher than that of 
the least oversubscribed stock, 50.00 points versus 40.00. This result is not surprising 
given the different price-updating rules used for over- and undersubsc1ibed stocks. 
The last row of the matrix gives the median price conditional on the number of shares 
outstanding. It shows that price was a function of this variable. The median price of 
companies with the lowest number of shares outstanding was 1 00  points, or four times the 
median price of companies with the highest number of shares outstanding. This result 
might be exp1xtcd if  the demand for the former was higher than the demand for the latter, 
as documented for the first round. This demand pattern was not the case, however. When 
we control for relative demand, 11 sitablc difference-emerges between the median price of 
stocks with a high and a low number of shares outstanding. This effect prevails for all 
groups except the two with the highest relative demand. 
Another way to gauge the amount of noise in prices in troduced by the auctioneer's 
price-updating rules is to examine the rdationship between prices in the final round and 
subscription status during the li ve bidding rounds. The number of times a stock was 
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undersubscribed or the ordering of under- and oversubscriptions in the five rounds should 
be irrelevant for pricing if the auctioneer was driven solely by the price-discovery motive. 
Table 19 displays for each subscription path the number of companies, the median relative
demand in round 1, the median number of shares before rourid 1, the median posted price
in round 5, and the median number of shares left after round 5 in absolute and relative 
terms for the 1 ,236 remaining firms. The paths are ordered--the top (bottom) half 
representing over- (under-) subscribed stocks in the first round. 
A few paths dominate in terms of sample size; paths UOUUU and OUUUU, 
combined, comprise one-third of all companies. As documented earlier, alternating 
sequences of under- followed by oversubscriptions, such as OUOUO or UOUOU, are 
rare. Table 19 shows that a key determinant of the median price in round 5 was whether
the stock was over- or undersubscribed in the first round. The median price was often 
above (below) the unconditional p1ice of 33.33 points for over- (under-) subscribed stocks.
There were exceptions, however; 68 oversubscribed stocks in the first round finished with
a median price in round 5 below 33.33 points. Only 1 4  undersubscribed stocks in the first
round finished with a price greater than 33.33 points.
The finding that the p1ice in round 5 is coffelated with the subscription status in the 
first round is reassuring. It confirms earlier evidence that prices reflected the companies' 
fundamentals. I t  is surprising, however, to find that the paths lead to d ifferent median 
prices. If the sample size was large enough for any single path, one would expect, given 
the law of large num bers. that different paths would lead to the same price; i. e. , price
should reflect stock fundamentals and not the subscription path. Similarly, how many 
' times a stock was undersubscribed in the five rounds should not matter. The evidence 
presented in Table 20, however, shows that, for the two most frequent paths, three and 
four  undersubscriptions. the median price in round 5 was 1 4.29 and 3 3 . 3 3  points,
respect ively. Clearly, both the subscription path and the number of undersubscriptions 
affected price. 
6.2 The fully subscribed stocks 
The previous section showed that stock p1ice in round 5 was a function of subscription 
status. Our analysis thus far has foc used on under- and oversubscribed stocks, but another
group of stocks, those that were fu l ly subscribed, represent one-fifth of the total. Political 
pressure to have a cerc.iin number of stocks ful ly subsc1ibed in each round may explain this
result. The question of why these stm:ks were fu l ly  subscribed is of less in terest in this 
s tudy,  however, than whether they wen: systematica l ly  mispriced . As Table 3 
documented , the median price of  fu l l y-subscribed stocks was lower in each round than 
either the under..: or oversubscribed stocks in that round, which suggests that such stocks
were underpriced. 
To test this hypoth1:sis, we computed,  in each round, the difference between the price 
at which stocks were ful ly suhsc ri hed and the median price in round 5 of a control group 
created hy sorting the stocks into 1 0  groups of equal  size according to the relative demand
in round 1 .  This procedure al l owed us Lo control for the relative demand in round 1 and
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hence for the stock fundamentals. The price difference should be equal to zero. The 
unconditional cross-sectional distribution of the price difference conditional on the round 
number is reported in Table 2 1 .  The unconditional and conditional medians are negative, 
which suggests that the fully subscribed stocks were underpriced. Further, evidence exists 
that, as expected, the underpiicing decreased during the rounds. 
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7 Conclusions 
The artificial primary market created by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Finance for the mass 
privatization of nearly 1 ,500 companies was a unique experiment in the history of financial 
markets. The. principal goal of the auction was quickly to transfer billions of dollars in 
assets to Czechoslovak citizens in a politically acceptable manner. In their zeal to achieve 
this goal, auction officials purposefully injected noise into the bidding process and thus 
reduced the usefulness of the aucLion as a mechanism for revealing value. The cause was 
not the design of the auction per se but the price-updating rules used by the auctioneer,
which consistently mispriced securities to absorb points and speed up the transfer of assets 
to private investors. Political expediency simply took precedence over price discovery. 
Prices did reflect fundamental values--such as profits, growth, and risk--but this 
information had been largely impounded by the end of the first round. Afterwards, 
accumulating non-uniform pricing en-ors created noise. The results of this study suggest 
that designers of politically motivated auctions face a tradeoff between socially acceptable 
outcomes and efficient price discovery. 
As data become avai lable, the recen tly completed second wave of voucher 
pri vatization in the Czech Republic will allow for out-of-sample verification of the results 
reported in this paper. Also, the usefulness of the auction as a mechanism to reveal value 
awaits a more definitive test that woul d compare, cross-sectionally, auction prices and 
market prices for the stocks that now trade on public stock exchanges. This issue, as well 
as others--such as the optimal timing of bids for IPFs and individuals and the existence of 
manipulative bids--arc kft to future research. 
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Appendix 1 
Definitions of accounting variables 
1 .  · Miscell aneous
• Sales = sales for the year 1 99 1
• Profits = profits for the year 1 99 1
• Bdebt = bank debt for the year 1 99 1
• Employ = employee numbers in 1 99 1
• Tdebt = total debt
• Assets
• INS = ratio of the number of shares in the voucher program to the total number of
shares outstanding
2 .  Leve rage meas ures
• Lev I = Bdebt!fdebt
• Lev2 = Bdeht/ Assets
• Lev3 = Tdebt/ Assl!ts
3 .  Profi tabili ty measures 
• ROA = ProliLc;/Assets
• Margin = Profits/Sales
• Produc = ProfiL.JEmploy
4 .  G rowth meas ures
• Gsalcs = mean of sales growth i n  1 990 and 1 99 1
• Gpro lits = mean of profi t growth in 1 990 and 1 99 1
• Ghdebt = mean of hank debt growth in 1 990 and 1 99 1
• Gemp loy = mean of employee numbl!r growth in 1 990 and 1 99 1
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5 . Risk measures 
• Riskl = standard deviation of margin during the years 1989-91
• Risk2 = standard deviation of productivity during the years 1989-91
• Risk3 = standard deviation of retum on assets
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A ppendix 2 
Definitions of industry codes: code, industry, 
and number of companies in the industry (in parentheses) 
• 00 Other and nonspecified ( 1 )
• 1 1  Agdculture (6 1 )
• 1 2  Forestry (2)
• 1 3  Water supply (6)
• 
• 2 1  Fuel industry ( 1 5)
• 22 Production of elect.lie power ( 17)
• 23 Iron and steel industries ( 1 1 )
• 24 Non-feITous indusu·ies (4)
• 25 Chemical and rubber indusu·y (27)
• 26 Engineering (234)
• 27 Electrotechnical industry (5 1 )
• 28 Building mate1ials industry (6 1 )
• 29 Woodworking industry (5 1 )
• 
• 30 Metalworking industry (2 1 )
• 3 1  Pulp and paper industry ( 1 4)
• 32 Glass, ch ina and stoneware industry ( 1 8)
• 33 Textile industry (42)
• 34 Clothing industry (2)
• 35 Leather, hoot, shoe and fur industry (7)
• 36 Printing industry (20)
• 37 Food industry ( 1 48)
• 38 Cooling and tohacco industries (8)
• 39 Other industrial activities ( 8 )
• 
• 4 1  Building and civil engineering (224)
• 43 Geological activity (30)
• 45 Design activity (86)
• 
• 5 1  Transpo11 (.19)
• 53 Communication (4)
• 
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• 61 Domestic trade (60)
• 62 Foreign trade (34)
• 63 Supply and sales of goods (4)
• 64 Supply of agricultural goods (43)
• 66 Publishing activities (5)
• 69 Other trade activities (5)
• 
• 71  R&D in agriculture and foresu-y (0)
• 72 R&D in basic production (25)
• 73 R&D in consumer and food i ndusu·ies (7)
• 74 R&D in construction (7)
• 75 R&D in transport and communication (0)
• 76 R&D in commerc ial activities (2)
• 77 Fundamental science research (2)
• 78  Research and science services (2)
• 79 Services in R&D (0)
• 
• 8 1  Housing (2)
• 82 Hotel i ndustry ( 4)
• 83 Recreational services (7)
• 84 Publ ic u ti l i ties (9)
• 85 Education (0)
• 86 Cultural services (4)
• 87 Medical and other health services (25)
• 88 Social care (0)
• 
• 9 1  Other services (29)
• 92 Banking (6)
• 93 Insurance ( I  )
• 95 Public admin istration , courts ( 1 )
• 96 Secuiity and national defense (5)
• 97 Social organizations acti vity (0)
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Appendix 3 
Evolution of the price-updating rules 
The contribution, or weight, of each of the four variables in the price-updating rule as well 
as the shape .of the function Fi changed from one round to the next. The m ost salient
features of this process are summarized · here. 
• After the first round, the auctioneer used (see Figure 2):
- for oversubscribed stocks, a l inear pricing rule with a slope b1 equal to 1 for
stocks with a relative demand lower than IO and, otherwise, a lower slope;
- for undersubscribed stocks, a step function. The repricing factor R1 was 0.43
for stocks wi th relative demand between 0.20 and 0.67. It bottomed out at 
0.30 for approximately 400 stocks. Thi s  particular group had a relative 
demand under 0.20 in the first round and included the stocks with the highest 
median number of shares remaining. 
These rules did not apply to undersubscribed stocks with few shares left. Instead, 
their prices were i ncreased .  Summary s tatistics on the sample size, median 
relative demand. and med ian number of shares remaining before and after round 1 
are given in  Tahle 22 for each of the 20 repricing factors. 
• After the second round, the auctioneer segmented the companies into six groups.
The characteristics of each group are presented in Table 23.
- Group 2 . 1 contains the 82 stocks that were oversubscribed in both rounds. 
The auctiom:er used a l inear pricing rule with a slope b2 equal to 1 .
- Group 2.2 contains the 43 1 stocks undersubscribed in the first round but
oversuhscrihed in the second. The same l inear pricing rule was used: a slope 
equal to 1 .0 (0.5) for s tocks with a relative demand less (greater) than 3.0.
- Group 2 .1 includes the 71 stocks oversubscrioed in the first round wi th a
relative demand exceed ing 3 hut undersuhscribed in  the second. The number
of shares remai n i ng for each or these stocks was greater than 1 1 ,000. A 
l i near pri":ing ru le with a s lope of zero was used. In other words, the price 
was u nchanged. 
- Group 2.4 inc ludes the 1 '27 stocks oversubscribed in the first round but with
a relative demand le�" than 1 and undersubsc1ibed in  the second. The number 
of shares left e xceeded 1 1 .000 in a l l cases. Price was decreased i n
accordance w i th a step function that took on  any one of  seven values. The
lowest (h ighest) n:pri<.: ing  factor for this group was 0.30 (0.75). 
- Group 2.5 is de lined as the "smal l  leftovers" group, i. e . •  stocks that were
under- or ovcrsuhscrihed in the first round but undersubscribed in the second 
and having fewer than 1 1 ,000 remai ning shares. For this group of 248
stocks. the price was incn:ased according to the rectangular function described 
3 1
previously. The repricing function took on any of four values, up to a 
maximum of 4. See Figure 3. 
- Group 2.6 includes the 482 stocks undersubscribed in rounds 1 and 2. They 
were repriced according to the rectangular function with any one of eight 
values ranging from 0. 103 to 0.750. 
The �verpricing of the 32 1 stocks in groups 2.3 and 2.5 is particularly obvious. 
These stocks were undersubscribed, but their prices were unchanged or increased. 
For the undersubscribed stocks in both rounds, group 2.6, the auctioneer was 
forced to lower the price after failing to do so after the first round. For this group, 
one trading round was wasted because of the overpricing strategy. The substantial 
decrease in price was responsible for the increase in the unconditional median 
relative demand after round 2, which peaked at 0.769. 
• After round 3, the price-updating rules were simplified. Except for a small
number of companies, the function F4 is linear with either a slope of zero or 1 .
P1ices were unchanged for 707 of the remaining 1 ,370 companies. The repricing
factor R4 was unchanged for, respectively 46 , 333, 69, and 1 94 companies out of
the 49, 39 1 ,  1 27 .  and 248 surviving companies in the previously formed groups
2. 1 ,  2.2, 2.4,  and 2.5 and increased for the other companies in those groups even
though they were undersuhscribed in round 3. Two groups stand out. Group 2.3 
contains compan ies that were undersubscribed in the second round and whose 
prices were unchanged. Not surprisingly, they were deeply undersubscribed in 
round 3, forc ing the auc tioneer to lower the piices. The prices were lowered for 
the 4 1  most undt:rsubsc1ihed stocks of the 73 remaining in that group. Group 2.6 
contains the stocks that were undersuhscrihed in the first two rounds and whose 
prices were significantly lowered afler round 2. These companies were highly 
oversubscribed in round 3. Their prices were increased through use of a linear
pricing rule  with a s lope of I except for the most  heavily oversubscribed stocks
(relative demand of 10 or grcati.:r). 
• After round 4. notwithstanding the tick size and the piice distortions it introduced,
the price-se l l i n g  ruk was sim ilar for a l l  remaining stocks. Although m ost
companies wt:rt: undersu hscrihed i n  round 4 ,  in 866 cases out of 1 ,3 1 7  the
auctioneer applied tht: saml.' l i nt:ar pricing ru le, wi th a constant a5 = 0.50 and a
s lope b5 = 1 .0. A company w i t h  n:lative demand equal to 1 .0 had its price
increased hy 50 pt:n.:cn l . ThL' crnnpan ics wt:rc overpriced even more than in the
previous round. The sy�h.: m a t i c  m·L'rpricing of stocks in the last two rounds
explains the d rop in  thL' u n�:ond i t ional  median relative demand after round 3
reported in Tabl e  3 ,  which <ll!cn!ascs from a peak of 0.769 in round 2 to 0.698
and 0.489 in thi: linal two rounds.
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Figure 1 
Approval Process for Large-Scale Privatization in Czechoslovakia 
PRIVATIZATION OPTIONS 
Direct sale Direct sale Employee: Retention Transfer 
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Repricing function after the first round for all remaining companies 
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Figure 2A 
Repricing function after the first round for all remaining companies 
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Note: Both figures adapted from Krcmar ( 1 992)
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Key events in the first wave of voucher privatization 
Start of economi� transition program 
Large privatization law is passed 
Deadline for basic projects 
Voucher registration 
Deadline for competing projects 
Round O 






Czech and Slovak republics split 
Distribution of shares from lirst wave begins 
January l, 1991 
February 26, 1991 
Qctober 31, 1991 
October l,  1991 to February 15, 1992 
January 20, 1992 
February 17 to April 26, 1992 
May 13, 1992 
May 18 to June 30, 1992 
July 8 to August 18, 1992 
August 26 to October 6, 1992 
October 14 to November 17, 1992 
November 23 to December 22, 1992 
January l, 1993 
May 29, 1993 
Table 2 
Unconditional cross-sectional distribution of accounting variables 
VARIABLE N Min Ql Medion Mean Q3 Max Std 
# Shares: 1489 7 1 3  333428 7 1 3 16 201405 179303 14754.374 606639 
INS: 1482 .092 .744 .969 .839 .970 . . 1. 14'  .202· 
Risk 1 1 3 4 1  0.0 0.21 2  .P4 1  .08 1 .077 1 0.40 .35 1  
Risk 2 1 346 o.o 6.24 12.83 37.68 27.93 9252 262.75 
Risk 3 1482 0.0 0.276 .057 . 134 . 1 1 0  5 8 . 1 7  1 .5 1  
Sales 1482 379.33 47679 1 22304 500437 329007 105085333 3 1 43866 
Profits 1 482 - 1 058 1 7  1 8 1 3  7744 51 859 26489 1 0543660 363765 
Bank debt 1 482 0.0 3299 1 5688 107392 73473 12290164 49597 1 
# Employees 1 482 3 1 75 3 80 9 1 6  886 36593 1 9 16 
Assets 1 482 1650 46 1 94 98 165 3 8 1 863 267833 56038412  1 8 1 .365 
Total dt"bl 1 482 0 15 1 1 9 59474 429258 1 8 8650 216006982 5695704 
ROA 1482 - . 8 1 5  mo .086 . 1 48 . 1 68 40.49 1 .06 
Margin 1 482 -3.91 .D3 1 .075 .085 . 1 33 .94 . 1 73 
Productivily 1482 · 1 93.56 8.69 20.86 46.62 42.09 668 1 200.50 
Lt'Vt"ragt 1 1455 0.0 . 1 53  .332 . 8 1 2  568 4 1 0.23 1 1 .64 
Lt'Vt"rage 2 1482 0.0 ,0(13 . 1 7 1  .284 .329 1 5.62 .568 
Lt"Vnag e 3 1482 0.0 .:!36 .509 I . I D  .943 75.53 3.21 
G profits 1 1 84 · 10 1 .23 . ,JCJR - .047:! .974 .563 603.06 22.28 
G t"mploy 1234 -.535 · .  l'.\8 . . 0874 - .097 -.044 .446 .092 
G bank dcbl 782 -. l <.O " 1 45 .0185 .253 .253 62. 1 4  2.42 
G salH 1 2 1 3  • ('9<1 . ,{)1)5� .02-16 .065 . 1 55 4.93 .33 
No1c: A flcr climinalion of '-'<1mr;1111c� wi1h 11c�a1 1 vc Iola.I tlchl . Sec A ppendix 1 for defi nitions.
G = growl.l1 ralc (%) .  
Table 3 
Panel A 
Unconditional cross-sectional distribution of the quoted price i n  each 
round 
ROUND N Min · Ql Median Mean Q3 Max Std 
1 1491  3 3 .3 3  33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 0 
2 1443 1 0.00 1 2.50 14.29 38.27 50.00 400.00 49.85 
3 1 370 1 .03 4 . 17  25.00 55.98 50.00 800.00 94.79 
4 1 3 17 1 . 17 7. 1 4 25.00 (/J.97 50.00 1000.00 1 12.02 
s 1 236 J .67 1 2.50 33 .33 59.65 66.67 1000.00 103 . 1 0  
Panel B 
Unconditional c ross-sectional distribution of the transaction price in  
each round 
ROUl'iD N Min QI Median Mean Q3 Max Std 
1 1 491  3J33 33 33 33.33 33.33 33.33 3 3.33 33.33 
2 1003 1 0 00  I I . I I 14 .29 42.52 50.00 300.00 52.7 
. 
J 863 1 .59 20 00 33.33 79.93 100.00 800.00 1 04.59 
4 947 1 .69 I <• (17 33.33 75.94 100.00 1000 .00 1 1 7.92 
s 1 1 1 8 2.33 14  :!9 33 .B 59.45 66.67 1000.00 94.84 
Note: # Values is the numhc:r of diffcrc.:111 \'aluc' tha1 pm:cs 1ook on in each round.









Cross-sectional distr0ibution of the quoted prices in  each round, 
conditional on subscription status 
Undersubscribed stocks 
ROUND N Min · Ql Medinn Menn Q3 Max Std 
1 1 0 1 3  33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 0 
2 930 10.00 1 1 . 1 1  14.29 42.81 50.00 300.00 53.86 
3 8 1 0  l .59 25.00 50.00 82.28 100.00 800.00 105.67 
4 866 1 .69 20.00 40.00 78.95 100.00 1 000.00 1 1 6.50 
5 1078 2.32 14.29 33.33 61 .00 66.67 1000.00 96. 1 5
Oversubscri bed stocks 
ROUND N Min QI Median Mew1 Q3 Max Std 
1 430 33.33 33.:13 33.33 33.33 33.33 3 3.33 0 
2 440 1 0.00 1 4.29 1 4 .29 28.60 25.00 400.00 40.98 
3 507 l .03 2 .63 4 . 1 7  15.22 I I . I  I 800.00 55.08 
4 370 1 .62 3 .5 7 6.25 22.68 16.62 1000.00 84.03 
5 1 1 8 1 .67 (1.25 I I . I  I 61 .56 40.00 1000.00 162.26 
Fully subscribed stocks 
ROU:'\D N Min QI ;\li·Jian !\lean Q3 Max St.d 
1 48 3 3 .33 3 1 1J 33 .33 33.33 33.33 33.33 0 
2 73 1 0.00 1 4 .�9 1 -1.29 38.83 50.00 200.00 35.59 
3 53 1 .59 3 57 16.67 43.94 33.33 400.00 78.74 
4 8 1  2.00 4.35 11.:n 43.69 33.33 1000.00 128.57 
5 40 2.94 4 .,q 9.55 17.70 20.00 1 00.00 2 1 . 1 3 
Table 4 
Panel A 
Unconditional cross-sectional distribution of the rel�tive demand i n  each 
round 
ROUND N Min QI Mediun Mean Q3 Max Std 
1 1491 .0037 . 1 69 .5 1 4  1 .23 1.32 1 45.40 4.32 2 1443 .0105 .360 .71 4  1 .2 1 1 .32 1 3.94 1 .55 
3 ·  1 370 .00 .3 1 4  .769 1 . 1 7  1 .68 1 1 .00 1 . 1 8  
4 1 3 1 7  .01 5  .280 .698 .91 1 . 1 8  3 3 . 1 8  l.39
5 1236 .027 .283 .489 .66 .8 1 1 4.71 .88 
Panel B 
Cross-sectional distribution of the relative demand i n  each round 
conditional on subscription status 
Undersubscri bed stocks 
ROUND N Min QI M"dian Mean Q3 Max Std 
l 1 0 1 3  .004 .094 .285 .341  .536 .999 .274 
2 930 .OJ I .228 .473 .469 .677 .996 .27 1  
3 8 1 0  .02 1 . 1 96 .378 .429 .63 1 .998 .267 
4 866 .0 1 5  . 1 87 .399 .442 .69 1 1 .00 .288 
5 1078 .027 .261 .432 .472 .686 .998 .256 
Oversu bscribed stocks 
ROUND N Min QI i\l('di.un !\lean Q3 Max Std 
I 430 100 1 .47 2.02 3 .35 3.46 1 45.40 7.63 
2 440 1 .00 1 . 40 2. 1 1 2.79 3.5 1 1 3.94 2 .01 
3 507 I 01 1 .5� 2 .()(. 2 .37 2.89 1 0.99 1 . 1 6  4 370 I .O J  J . 27 1 47 1 .96 1 .85 3 3 . 1 9  2.26 
5 1 1 8 1 .02 1 . 22 1 .47  2.24 2.22 1 4 .7 1 2. 1 5
Fully s u bscri bed stocks 
ROUND N Min Q I  Mrdiun l\lt'Wl Q3 M ax Std 
I 48 1 .00 1 .94 I 09 I . I  I 1 . 1 5  J .94 . 1 37 
2 73 J .00 1 .02 I O� 1 .07 1 . 1 0 1 . 37 .065 
3 53 .00 I .OJ 1 .cx. 1 .04 I . I O  1 . 1 9 . 1 66  
4 8 1 1 .00 1 .0� I ()(, 1 .08 I . I  I 1 .68 .084 
5 40 1 .00 1 .0� I 04 1 .05 1 .09 1 . 1 7  .043 
Note: For the fully suhscrihcd s1ocb. the 0 min value in round 3 refers to a company thal was
removed from the auction . 
Table 4 
Panel C 
Cross-sectional distribution of the relative demand in  each round 
condi tional on investor type 
IPFs 
ROUND N l'rlin Ql Ml•dinn Ml'llll Q3 Mnx Std 
1 1 4 9 1  . 00  .046 .343 .669 .870 9.02 .990 
2 1 443 .00 .066 .352 .540 .7 1 7  6.93 .695 
3 1 370 .00 .014 . 3 1 5  .506 .766 4.72 .596 
4 1 3 1 7  .00 .00 . 1 59 .309 .525 2.33 .369 
5 1 236 .00 .00 .044 . 152 .229 1 .86 . 2 1 9  
Indi viduals 
ROUND N Min QI l\li·dian Ml'UIJ Q3 Mnx Std 
1 1491  .cm .0<1:? . 1 4 1  .564 .389 1 37.05 3 . 80 
2 1 443 .01 1 . 1 40 .mi .664 .704 1 2 .42 1 . 1 2  
3 1 370 .00 . 1 7J .�49 .664 .879 8.78 .79 
4 1 3 1 7  00 • J 7'J .�RO .'.i99 .649 33 . 1 8 1 .33  
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Aggregate number of poi nts bid, used and leftover: 
total and conditional on investor type (points in billions) 
Total mdowment • 8.59 billion 
Poi nu Poiru Percentage of Poinrs Used/ Points Used/ 
Used Left Poinrs Left Poinrs Bid I Points Used 
2.98 5.61 65.29% 65.29 % 35.23 % 
3.41 2.20 25.62 69.89 40.38 
1 .02 1 . 1 8  1 3.73 5 1 .28 1 2.09 
0.5 1 0.68 0.08 5 1 .46 6.08 
0.52 0. 1 5 O.o:! 92. 1 7 6.1 4
8.44 - - -- -- 100.00 
IPF endowment = 6.18 billion 
Pc•nU Pomu Percentage of Poin!S Used/ Poinrs UsecV 
l 'iecl Left Points Lefl Poinrs Bid I Points Used 
2.33 3.85 62.27 39.46 % 38.20 % 
2.5.i 1 .30 21 . 1 1  72.45 4 1 .68 
0.7 1 0.59 9.60 56.80 1 1 .66 
0.26 0.33 5.36 47.58 4.29 
0.25 O.o7 1 .25 88.1 3 4. 1 7
6. 10 -- -- -- 1 00.00 
Individual endowment "' 2.41 billion 
Points Poi nu Percentage of Points Used/ Points Used/ 
Used Left Points Left Points Bid I Points Used 
0.65 1.76 73.04 32.92 % 27.80 % 
0.86 p.90 37. 1 7 63.30 36.98 
0.3 1 0.59 24.38 4 1 .86 13.19  
0.25 0.34 13.96 56.23 1 0.74 
0.26 0.08 O.oJ 96.41 1 1 .28 







84. 1 4 --
--
Points Bid/ Points Bid by Group/ 
Poinrs Left Total Points Bid 
9228 % 74.54 % 
9 1 .22 11.99 
96.02 62.98 
92.75 55.21 
87.05 5 1 .38 
-- --
Points Bid/ Points Bid by Group( 
Points Left Total Points Bid 








Unconditional distribution: num ber of shares left before and after each round 
ROUND N Min Qt Median Mean QJ Max 
x 1 06 
BEFORE 1 1491 713 33428 71301 200800 1 79303 1 4.75 
AFfER 1 1443 58 20681 49034 1 45938 1 27859 9. 1 7
AFfER l 1370 1 0  9340 30122 96443 73232 6.75 
AFfER 3 1 3 17 1 3  5 142 19640 75608 55850 �.75 
AFfER 4 1 236 7 2572 9 190 50566 32604 6.75 
AFfER s 1 1 96 3 1284 3076 1 8019 12261 1 . 57 
Panel B 
Cross-sectional distribution :  num ber of shares left after each round, 
conditional on subscription status 
Undersubscribed stocks 
ROUND N l\Lin Q I  Mcdilll  Mean Q3 Max 
x 106 
A FfER 1 1013 1379 42026 80 1 92 221302 1 87661 1 4.75 
A FfER 2 930 7 1 3  29447 67453 1 78037 1 79282 9. 17
AFfER 3 8 1 0  58 5996 1 7759 63039 54081 5. 1 2
AFfER 4 866 13  3605 1 2227 50272 37940 3.21 
A FfER s 1078 1 7  2746 9095 50657 3 1 1 24 6.75 
Oversubscribed stocks 
ROUND N t.Un Q I  l\11'dl1111 Mclln QJ l\fox 
x I 06 
A FfER 1 430 7 1 3  I R657 42862 1 40050 1 35 1 4 1  2.92 
A l-IER 2 440 58 9255  22642 72 1 84 55824 5. 1 2
A FfER J 507 1 0 ism 49867 1 5 1 1 52 I 17304 6.75 
A FTER 4 370 36 1 4 26.l 406119 1 24 2 1 0  90 1 59 6.75 
A FTER s I 1 8  7 � I  4-0SJ 352 1 3  1 8004 0.60 
Fully subscribed stocks 
ROUND N Min Q I  Mrdlan l\1<'1111 QJ Mllx 
x 1 06 
AFTER I 48 5 5.\3 472 1 s 96235 3 1 2329 236974 2.74 
A FfER 2 73 930 297 1 1<  651<99 1 72863 132304 2.42 
A FTER J SJ 1 873 1 7464 44035 83601 83540 0.45 
A FfER 4 8 1  26 24 578 5 1 740 1 24465 1 28748 1 .08 





































2 1 .SS 
Sum 
x 106 
224. 1 8  
165.57 



















Frequency and probability of events in two consecutive rounds 
Events: 0 = oversubscribed 
U = undersubscribed 
F = fully subscribed 
Roundj + 1 lj Round 2 1 1
Type 
00 # 49 
% 3.4 
OU # 348 
% 24. 1
OF # 33 
% 2.3 
uu # 582 
% 40.3 
uo # 3 9 1  
% 27. 1 
UF # 40 
% 2.8 
Total # 1 443 
% 100.0 
Round 3 1 2 Round 4 1 3 Round 5 1 4
1 7  224 1 2  
1 .2 1 7.0 1 .0 
4 1 1 2 1 3  328 
30.0 16.2 26.5 
12 70 30 
0.9 5.3 2.4 
399 653 750 
29. l 49.6 60.7 
490 146 106 
35.8 1 1 . 1  8.6 
4 1  1 1 10 
3 .0 0.8 0.8 
1 3 70 1 3 17 1236 
100.0 100.0 1 00.0 
Pan el B 
Nu mber of times a stock was und crsu bscribcd in the five rounds 
# # [,·cnts Frequency (%) 
0 0 0.00 
1 3 0.25 
2 6 1  5. 1 0
3 368 30.77 
4 693 57.94 
5 7 1 5.94 
Total 1 1 96 100.00% 
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Frequency and percentage of mispriccd stocks 
Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
Group 
1 426 (29.52%) 414 (30.22%) 4 16  (31 .59%) 
2 939 (65.07%) 631 (46.06%) 102 (7.74%) 
3 4 (0.00%) 26 ( 1 .90%) 91 (6.91%) 
4 74 (5. 13%) 299 (2 1 .82%) 708 (53.76%) 
Total 1443 100.00% 1370 100.00% 13 17  100.00% 
Note: Group I = Oversubscribed stocks whose price was increased.
Group 2 = Undersubscribed stocks whose price was decreased. 
Group 3 = Oversubscribed stocks whose price was decreased. 
Group 4 = Undersubscribed stocks whose price was increased.
Round 5 Total 
367 (29.69%) (30.25%) 
286 (23. 14%) (36.49%) 
3 (00.00%) (2.31%) 
580 (46.92%) (30.95%) 
1236 1 00.000/o 100.00% 
Table 9 
Cross-sectional distribution of the ratio of relative demand and the subsequent repricing factor 
M=D/R as a proxy for mis1>ricing 
Unconditional : Pooled u ndersubscribed and oversubscribed 
ROUND N Min Ql Median Mean Q3 M11:1 Std 
2 1443 .0122 .39 1 .952 .820 1 . 1 1  12. 1 2  . 5 52 
3 1370 .0700 .476 .986 .950 1.27 3.00 .493 
4 1 3 1 2  .0228 .303 .622 .833 1.27 7.83 .626 
s 1236 .0292 298 .497 .568 0.9 1  12.33 .499 
Con dit ional : Oversubscribed stocks 
ROUND N Min Ql M<'tliun Mean Q3 Mox Std 
2 430 . 1 74 1 .02 1 .06 1 . 13 1 . 1 4  1 2 . 1 2  . 5 84 
3 930 .63 1 .983 1 .08 1 . 2 1  1 .33 3.01  .349 
4 507 .507 1 . 1 8  1 .42 1 .53 1 .83 7.83 . 565 
s 370 .544 .943 .996 1.03 1.04 12.35 .684 
Con d itional : U ndcrsu bscribcd stocks 
ROUND N Min Q I  Mt"tlian M.-un Q3 Mox Std 
2 1 0 1 3  .0 1 2 . 266 62 5 687 1 .03 2.22 .481 
J 440 .070 .361 78 5  825 1 .20 2.9 1 .502 
4 8 10 .02.l .2 1 1  lH 399 .556 .99 .232 
s 866 .29 1 .239 .l'J.j :\61! . 504 .74 . 1 55 
Table 10 
Results of the logistic and OLS regressions with the stepwise selection technique 
Logistic OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent Variable Subscription Status, 0 Aggregate Demand, D Individual Demand, IND IPF Demand, IPF 
Variable Name Estimate p-Val Estimate p-Val Estimate p-Val Estimate 
Interct>pt 9;05 .0001 4.91 .0001 2.53 .0001 3.00 
Industry dummy 1 - -- - - - -- -.207 
Industry dummy 3 .677 .0008 .317 .0003 - -- .195 
Industry d ummy 4 - -- - - - -- -.143 
Industry dummy 8 1.21  .0104 -4703 .0146 .256 .0162 -
INS -4.5" .0001 -1.288 .0001 -.381 .0264 -1.213 
SHARE - -- -.1 87 .0007 -.173 .0001 -.0803 
ROA 3 .. 4.f .0001 2.07 .0001 1.045 .0001 1.072 
Levl -.0124 .0355 - - - -- -
Lev3 -- -- -.09 1 1  .0003 -.0409 .0002 -.054 
Tdebt -.65 1 .0001 -.1 1 8  .0052 - -- -.0832 
Profits .3"1 .0001 .0584 .0008 - -- .0575 
Risk 2 - -- .0025 .0072 .0011 .0123 .0022 
Rlsk 3 - -- .7486 .0264 - -- -
G sales .785 .�07 - -- - -- .166 
G employ - -- 1.29 .0026 - -- -
EMPLOY -.3 1 6  .0180 - - - -- -
ASSETS - -- .506 .0003 .301 .0001 -
DCS - -- - -- .0866 .�26 -
Adjusted R2 N.A. .425 .300 .456 
% correctly classified 11  117.J•;. l'\.A. N.A. N.A. 
ovenubscrlbl.'d 
•;. Incorrectly dasslf1ed 1 2.5% l'\.A. N.A. N.A. 
as und rnubscrlbt'd 
Note: Log transformation has been applied to the following \'ariables: SHARE, Tdebt, EMPLOY, ASSETS. 
For the variable Profits, JO groups of equal s11.e were fom1ed by ascending order. 























Table 1 1  
Median relative demand conditional on relative demand in the previous round, 
segmented in 12 grou1>s: rounds 2-5 CDj+t I Dj) 
Median Relative Demand, Dj+t I D· J 
Round Round Round 
D2 I DI DJ I D2 D4 I DJ 
Group 
l\Iedian Medlun Median Median Median Medlwt 
D1 D2 D2 D3 D3 D4 
1 .029 . 146 .087 1 . 19  .099 .098 
2 .093 .3 19  .227 1.77 .194 .212 
3 . 2 15  .536 .381 1.33 .309 .298 
4 .359 .975 .541 1.08 .469 .497 
5 .537 2.07 .677 1 .23 .632 .702 
6 .808 3.01 .871 .630 .857 l.02 
7 1 . 1 9 .93 1 1 .08 .793 1 . 14  .982 
8 1 .36 .747 1.25 .642 1.39 .979 
9 1.64 .716 1 .55 .523 1.76 l.03 
10  2.20 .697 2. 1 7  .349 2.76 1 . 10 
1 1  3.27 .601 3.30 .347 2.76 l .02 
12 5.S I . 5 1 5  5.48 .321 3.89 l.37 
U ncondit ional 
m edian . S l 4  .714 .714 .769 .769 .698 
x2 Statistic 479.13 333.86 581.14 
Note :  The p-val ue of the .r2 statistic is less than o.oo I in all cases. 
Round 
ns I D4 
Median Median 
D4 D5 
.084 . 184 





1 .07 .554 
1 . 1 8  .845 
1 .31  .798 
1 . 47 .737 

















ti on al 
Table 12 
Median relative demand of IND in roundj+l conditional on the relath•e demand 
of IND and IPF in roundj 
(IND j+ 1 I INDj, IPFj) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
56 22 28 19 6 10  3 - -
.077 . 121 .067 .067 .094 .226 .283 
23 24 28 25 16 12 1 1  4 1 
. 104 .1 1 5  . 1 04 .I 5 5  . 177 .208 .432 1 .68 .04 
24 1 8 21 1 7  1 8  22 16 7 2 
. 1 24 . 148 .207 .208 . 178 .442 .771 1.30 .411 
19 1 4  1 6  20 16  20 21 12 6 
. 1 60 .499 .203 .208 .474 .496 .892 1 . 15  .060 
12 10 16 1 7  26 21 20 16 6 
. 1 44 .253 .2 1 5  .491 .336 .760 1.25 1.13 .089 
5 12 12 1 9  21 13 17 1 8  20 
.276 .459 .349 .366 .542 .955 1.53 .998 .108 
5 20 1 1  15  1 1  1 7  1 8  1 8  23 
.247 .934 .495 .597 1.96 1.71 2.30 .323 .127 
1 3 6 5 17 11  15  3 1  29 -- 1 .48 1 .24 2.62 1.77 1 .83 1 .70 .31 1  .191 
-- 5 6 4 8 JO 15  2 5  33 
205 2. 1 7  1 .32 3. 14  . 5 9  .59 .401 .240 
6 I 3 5 3 8 14  24 -- .636 .571 .554 .835 .325 .510 .419 .332 
1 44 1 44 1 45 1 44 1 44 1 45 144 145 144 











1 8  
. 106 
38 




. 1 59 
Median rclatiYe demand of IPF in round j+ I conditional on the relative demand of IND and IPF in round 
j 
(IPF.r- 1 I IPFj, INDj) 
IPF I 2 J 4 s 6 7 8 9 10 
IND 
56 23 24 1 9  1 2  5 5 -- --- --
I .00 . 1 00 .028 .027 .00 .00 .204 
22 24 1 8  1 4  1 0  1 2  20 1 3  5 6 
l .00 .00 0-16 . 226 .066 .0 1 9  .080 ,0 1 5  . 1 33 .004 
28 28 2 1  1 6  1 6  1 2  I I  6 6 I 
J .085 .085 . 2 19 .207 .078 . 1 1 2 .224 1 .54 .284 .00 
1 9  25 1 7  20 1 7  1 9  1 5  5 4 3 
4 .078 .288 .267 2H .240 . SS I  .755 .696 . 174 .00 
6 1 6  I I  1 6  26 2 1  I I  1 7  8 5 
s . 1 88 .357 420 4 '  I 495 733 I . I  I .527 .984 .088 
1 0  12  �i 20 2 1  1 3  1 7  I I  1 0  3 
6 .329 .4 1 0  SILi \114 I 02  799 1 .02 1 .24 .288 .0 1 4  
3 1 1  1 6 2 1  20 1 7  1 8  1 5  1 5  8 
7 .98 .83 I 01 I 01 ! 1 S 1 1 7 1 .84 .242 . 160 .3 1 7  
-- 4 7 1 2 1 6  1 8  1 8  3 1  25 1 4 
8 285 I 71 2 1 4  1 1174 333 .505 .461 .366 .054 
-- I 2 6 6 20 23 29 33 24 
9 .560 775 508 . 6 1 5  .604 .503 .375 . 1 92 
2 6 1 8  38 80 
10 -- --- -· -- ·- .346 .732 .679 .434 .370 
Unt'ondl· 1 44 144 145 1 4 5  1 44 1 44 1 45 144 1 45 144 
tlonal .052 .2 1 4  . 267 42<> .533 .558 .6 1 0 .503 .363 .252 
Note: INDj in rows, and !PF) m columns 














































.4 1 1  
1443 
.352 
Table 13  
Median relative demand conditional o n  nu mber of shares left before the auction (NS) segmented in  12 groups b y  Investor type: rounds 1 -5 
( I N Dj+ t  I N Sj), (IPFj+ t  I N Sj) 
Rou nd 1 
Group Mtdlan Mtdlan NSo IND1 
I 7 89 9 1  
2 1 7  9� .C2 
3 28 J I  2" 
4 38 34 I I  
5 49 8 1 1 2  
6 62 80 I )  
7 81 07 10 
9 1 4 7  .\II 1 0 
I 0 224 I )  Oii 
I I J6.l 79 Cll 
] 2 782 74 (ll 
U n condl 
-
t l o n a l  7 1  30 1 4 1  
med i a n  
xlstatistlc 26 1 .92 
Notes: NSj = # of shares x 1 0-3. 
Round 2 
Mtdlan Mtdian Mtdian IPF1 NS1 IND2 
.. I J 26 I 1 2  
... 9 9 7  80 
31 17 45 60 
J I  24 0 1  .46 
J I  J I  99 35 
2 2  42 05 25 
?8 � 7 0 1 2 1  
26 I OJ 7 2 12 
34 1 �11 58 1 5 
}4 2 72 49 1 3  
44 600 2 6  . 1 2  
.43 49 03 .278 
1 3.03 450.69 
NSo = lhe number of shares outstanding before round I .  
Mtd.ian Mrdian IPF2 NS2 





46 25. 1 2  
26 35.04 
42 63 33 
40 92.24 
22 1 70.42 
.41 392.64 
.352 30. 12 
34.98 
The p-value of the x2 statistic is less than 0.001 in all cases except for IPF1 . 
Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
Mrdian .M ... dian Mtd.ian Mrdian Median Median Median Median IND3 IPF3 N5l IND4 IPF4 NS4 JND5 IPF5 
.25 .00 .52 .35 .00 .22 .51 .00 
.24 .00 2.01 .28 .00 .94 .38 .00 
.20 .00 3.89 .24 .00 2.02 .33 .00 
.32 .22 6.40 .21 .02 3.26 .30 .00 
.47 .39 1 0.89 .39 . I I  4.92 .30 .01 
.34 .29 1 6.34 .42 . 1 9  7.31 .32 .03 
.47 .43 23.38 .46 . 1 7  10.85 .30 .05 
.44 .48 46. 1 8  .53 .41 23.64 .37 . 1 0  
.48 .63 69.08 .43 .47 40.74 .35 . 1 9  
.46 .55 1 1 8.45 .43 .44 70.48 .30 .22 
.66 .71  303.78 .48 .54 222.40 .36 .36 
.349 .315 19.64 .380 .159 9.19 .332 .044 
1 27.87 280.92 94.33 341.47 29.14 431.6 
G roup Round 2 
Medians 
p , I N D2 
1 1 0.00 .o� 
2 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 3  
3 1 2.50 .2 1 
4 14.29 .5 3 
5 1 6.67 l .S4 
6 20.00 l .92 
7 25.00 1 .68 
8 33.33  I.:! I 
9 37.50 .68 
1 0 40.00 .37 
1 1 42.86 .22 
1 2 50.00 .28 
1 3  60.00 .22 
1 4  66.66 .20 
1 5  75.00 .26 
1 6  1 00.00 .24 
1 7  1 50.00 . 14  
1 8  200.00 .3 1 
1 9  300.00 .22 
2 0  400.00 2.71 
U ncon d 1  -
t lo n a l  14.29 .28 
med i a n  
x 2 391 .37 
s t a t i s t i c  
Table 14  
Median relative demand cond itional on price segmented I n  1 2 ,  1 1, or 2 0  groups 
by I nvestor type: rounds 2-5 
( I N Dj+ l  I Pj), {IPFj+ l  I Pj) 
I N D IV I DUALS IPF's 
Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 2 Round 3 
Medians Medians Medians Medians Medians 
P ,  IND" p'\  I N Dd p d I N D.::; r ,  I PF , r,, IPF'\ 
1 .96 .82 2 . 38 .95 4.00 .6 1 10.00 .00 1 .96 .43 
2 .50 .92 3 .85 .67 6.25 .53 1 1 . 1 1 .07 2.50 .68 
3 .57 1 . 1 6  5.88 .59 5.09 .53 12 .50 .06 3.57 .88 
4.76 1 .25 9.09 .53 14.28 .43 1 4.29 .57 4.76 .95 
14.29 .48 1 6.67 .53 20.00 .30 1 6.67 1 .78 1 4.29 .45 
20.00 .24 25.00 .30 25.00 .23 20.00 1 . 1 7  20.00 .41 
25.00 .24 33.33 .25 33.33 .24 25.00 1 .20 25.00 .31  
.l.l .U .27 40.00 .20 40.00 .25 33.33 .47 33.33 .24 
50. 00 .20 50.00 . 2 1  50.00 .29 37.50 .4 1 50.00 .05 
100.00 . 1 5  66.66 .35 66.66 .2 1 40.00 .48 1 00.00 .02 
200.00 . 1 5  1 00.00 . 1 6  100.00 .24 42.86 .56 200.00 .00 




1 00.00 .24 
150.00 .38 
200.00 . 10  
300.00 .31  
400.00 .22 
25.00 .35 25.00 .380 33.33 .332 14.29 .35 25.00 .31 5  
567.36 446.92 248.38 3 1 2.58 3 14.09 
Note: The p-value of the X2 statistic is less than 0.001 in all cases. 
Round 4 Round 5 
Medians Medians 
p'\ IPFd pd IPF.::; 
2.38 .35 4.00 .20 
3.85 .52 6.25 .20 
5.88 .44 9.09 .21 
9.09 .49 14.28 .05 
16.67 .24 - 20.00 .06 
25.00 .26 25.00 .04 
33.33 . 10  33.33 .03 
40.00 . 1 3  40.00 .02 
50.00 .09 50.00 .01 
66.66 . 1 5  66.66 .00 
100.00 .01 100.00 .00 
200.00 .00 200.00 .00 
25.00 .159 33.33 .045 
282.65 12 1 . 12  
Table 15 
Median relative demand in roundj, the repricing factor JV, the ratio of the former to the latter, 
and the relative demand in round j+l, total and segmented by investor type 
Unconditional 
Median Median 
Round N D·  J R· "} 
2 1 443 .490 .420 
3 1350 .666 1 .00 
4 1 3 1 2  .724 1 . 00 
5 1236 .748 1 .20 
Con d ition al: oversubscribed stocks 
Med ian Med ian 
Roun d  N D ·  J R· "} 
2 430 2.02 2.00 
3 440 2. 1 1  2.00 
4 507 2 .06 l .50 
5 3 70 1 .4 7  l . 50 
Cond it ional: u ndcrsubscribcd stocks 
Median Med ian 
Rou n d  N D ·  j R ·  '} 
2 1 0 1 3  .420 .625 
3 930 .472  4 IO  
4 8 1 0  . 3 78 I 00 
5 866 .399 I oo 
Median 





Median M_;= DjRj 
1 .065 
1 .081 
1 .4 1 9  
.996 
























.399 .3 1 5  




.223 .4 1 7  
.200 . 1 73 
.521  .5 1 3  
.375 .244 
Med i an Median INDj+t IPFj+l 
.300 .094 
.606 .478 
.240 .03 1 
.307 .000 
Table 16  
Median values for the mis1>ricing J>roxy Mj SJ>lit into 10 groups, the unconditional relative 
demand in the subsequent round Dj+1 ' and relati\'e demanq, segmented by in\•estor type 
(Dj+l I Mj), (INDj+l I Mj), (IPFj+t 1 Mj) 
Round 2 Round 4 
GROUP M· 'J Dj+l IND )+1 IPF j+l M· 'J D j+l IND j+l 
1 .084 . 1 35 .086 .007 . 1 12 .094 .076 
2 .222 .363 . 1 5 1  .067 .207 .216 . 160 
3 .39 1 .383 . 2 1 7  .097 .302 .306 .237 
4 .61 1 .770 .300 .237 .398 .440 .319 
5 .833 I .OJ .496 .473 .536 .579 .360 
6 . 995 .704 .263 .440 .717 .913 .626 
7 1 .04 .723 .278 .437 .991 1.03 .653 
9 1 .22 1 . 1 7  .482 .615 I .SS 1 . 02 .466 
10 1.49 2.35 1 .22 1 .05 2.05 1.35 .606 
Uncondi-
tional .952 .714 .279 .352 .623 .698 .380 
median 
Rou nd J Round 5 
G RO UP M· 'J D j+l I N D  j+l IPF j+l M· 'J D j+l IND j+l 
1 .239 .207 . 1 67 .000 . 1 22 . 1 69 . 123 
2 .339 .3 14 . 2 1 2  .0 1 6  .2 1 5  .257 . 1 87 
3 .476 . 734 . 362 .2 1 5  .298 .33 1 .273 
4 . 826 1 . 1 9 625 .552 .393 .377 .292 
5 .950 .722 291 .433 .48 1  589 . 5 1 2  
6 1 .03 .739 . 325  . :120 . 5 1 3  .864 .698 
7 I . I  I .1162 124 .3119 . 555 .623 . 537 
8 1 .27 I 0.' "' "  .493 .906 .649 .384 
9 1 .43 U2 6llll 5 1 9  .996 . 7 1 9  .429 
1 0  1 .68 I SI S.H 624 1 .02 .791 .336 
U ncondi-


























Logistic regressions in each round of the subscription status O/Uj+l on the proxy for mispricing Mj, the 
price level Pj, and the number of shares left NSj, with group dummies 
i=4 i=4 i=4 i=4 
· 
1 {Dj+1>I .O} = Ii a1j + Ii/3 ;jvl; + Ii r ijPJ + :2io;JIS;+e1, with j = 2, .  .. ,5 .  
i=I i=I i=I i=l  
Rou nd 2 Rou nd 3 Round 4 Round 5 
Statistic Estimate p-Val Estimate p-Val Estimate 
al .005 .996 -2.28 .223 
Intercept a2 2.29 .0689 -.443 .726 
a3 - - .393 .960 
a4 1 9.66 .0037 4.59 .0027 
�· .629 . 1 631 -.969 .203 
Mis pricing, �2 3.63 .0001 2.47 .0001 
M �3 - - -7.53 .159 
B4 -1 .19  .683 6.41 .0013 
'Yl -.0058 .0286 ,00168 .471 
Price, 'Y2 .0533 .3277 -.0291 .0001 
p 'Y3 - - -.0046 .717 
'Y4 -.0396 .0177 -.0023 .222 
Number 0 1  -.162 .049 .565 .701 
of 02 -.563 .0001 -.0121 .9025 
shares, 03 - -- .753 .2019 
NS 04 -.176 .00.0 -1. 138 .0001 
1 86.7% 93.0% 
2 13.2% 6.s•;. 
Group I :  Oversubscribed stocks for which reprici ng factor was increased. 
Group 2 :  Undersubscribed stocks for which repncmg factor was decreased. 
Group 3 :  Oversubscribed stocks for which repricing factor was decreased. 
Group 4: Undcrsubscribed stocks for which repncing factor was increased. 
I :  Pcrt:entage of companies correctly classified as o\·crsubscribcd. 



















p-Val Estimate p-Val 
.0001 -7.66 .0013 
.963 -3.17 .481 
.766 - -
.0001 -2.398 .0181 
.0001 2.82 .1467 
.0003 16.55 .0475 
.0289 - -
.0001 7.79 .0001 
.0805 .00311 .1534 
.0096 -.0046 .4365 
.631 - -
.0363 -.0061 .0073 
.0005 .249 .0389 
.5658 -.568 .1717 
.6861 - -




Median price in round 5 conditional on the median relative demand in  round 1, Dt and the 
number of shares outstanding before the auction, NSo: for companies not fully subscribed before 
round s <Ps I D1, NSo) . 
NSo: 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
D1 
u 1 3 2 1 3  1 3  1 9  33 20 29 23 22 
" 
20.00 1 8.33 7.69 7. 1 4  6.66 6.25 6.07 5.88 4.55 4.08 
u 2 3 I I  2 1  1 5  26 2 1  22 1 9  20 1 9  
50.00 20.00 1 1 . 1 1  1 2.50 1 0.55 7.69 1 1 .81 10.00 7.14 5.26 
u J 1 3  2 1  2 1  2 1  17 1 0  2 0  1 8  1 9  1 7  
33.33 2.5.00 25.00 1 6.66 1 6.66 1 5.48 20.00 15.48 14.29 16.67 
u 4 1 3  1 .5  1 4  27 1 9  1 7  1 7  1 6  1 9  20 
33.33 40.00 29. 1 7  2.5.00 20.00 33.33 25.00 2.5.00 33.33 20.00 
u 5 16 19 1 4  1 6  22 1 8  20 16 24 12 
83.33 .50.00 45.00 45.00 66.66 40.00 45.00 .50.00 40.00 29. 17 
0 6 9 14 1 3  5 3 6 3 6 3 8 
50.00 58.33 40.00 33.33 33.33 40.00 .50.00 45.00 33.33 29. 1 1  
0 7 1 6  6 7 6 3 3 .5 3 9 1 2  
83.33 .50 00 66.67 83.33 1 00.00 66.66 50.00 33.33 .50.00 33.33 
0 8 2 1  10 10 3 5 7 6 4 0 5 
1 00.00 100 00 83.33 33.33 .50.00 40.00 .58.33 45.00 .50.00 
0 9 I I  12 9 6 7 3 8 5 2 7 
1 00.00 1 00 00 1 00.00 .58.33 66.66 66.66 66.66 66.66 70.00 100.00 
0 10 1 8  1 4  2 I I  3 6 2 8 5 I 
200.00 200 00 200.00 200 00 200.00 1 00.00 66.66 1 00.00 1 .50.00 1 .50.00 
Uncondi-
tional 1 23 1 24 1 2 4 1 2.l 124 1 24 1 23 1 24 124 1 23 
median 1 00.00 .50 00 33 .33  2 .5  00 20 00 1 6.66 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Notes : • Relative dcffi31ld an col umns nnd number of shares in rows. 
• Relative dcffi31ld soncd anto I ll groups. the first five for undersubscribed stocks, and the 
last five for oversubscnbed stocks 
• The first number an each cell gl\·cs the number of observations, and the second number the 
median price an round 5 .  
































0 7 6 
8 3 5  
9 I 
10 1 6  
1 1  7 
1 2  204 
13 2 
1 4  I 
15  9 
16  37 
1 7  1 3  
18 307 
u 1 9  9 
20 1 .5 1  





26 7 1  
U nconditional 
mtdlan 1 236 
Table 19 
Median price and subscri1>tion path in round 5 
for com1>anies not fully subscribed before round 5 
Med Inn Medlon 
Relative Nwnber of Medlon Subscription Dl•mond In Shares before Price 11t Poth 
Round 1 Row1d 1 Rowid 5, 
D I NS0 
PS 
oooou 74.41 1 8860 575.00 
oouou I .JS 1 7456 100.00 
oouuo 2.26 404 152 1 50.00 
oouuu 1 .47 2 1049 83.33 
ouooo 1 .44 1461069 25.00 
ouoou 1.65 245227 40.00 
ououo 1.67 2 1 0421 58.33 
ououu 1 .78 1 1 4060 40.00 
ouuoo 1 2.04 102 1 7  1000.00 
ouuou 2.81  1 84891 100.00 
ouuuo 1 . 58 22691 200.00 
ouuuu 2.61  26371 100.00 
LJOOOU .098 40557 20.00 
LJOOLJO .079 27000 25.00 
l'OOUU .469 35594 33.33 
l lOllOU .307 461 1 7  33.33 
l lOUUO .451 40636 66.66 
UOlllJU .598 66037 33.33 
l fl ?OOO .072 105977 5.88 
Ul lOOU . 1 1 4 85369 7.69 
trUOUO . 1 03 95099 7. 1 4  
l :t !()l I LJ . 1 77 I J624 I 1 2.50 
l'.l 'l l<Xl .970 3 1 7 1 5 1  900.00 
llVl!Oll 052 1057 1 4  6.25 
t •trt :uo 2 20 1 04705 26.67 
n :uut1 JO'J 4 1 792 33.33 
- 4'J I 67207 33.33 
Note: O(U ) indicates subscriptton stalus--ovcrsubscnbcd ( undcrsubscribcd)-in round 1 .  
Median 
Median Shares Left 
Shares Left after Round 5, 
after Rowid S In percent, 
NS5 NS5 (0/o) 
1069 9.42 
1 483 4.13 
1 565 4.30 
2056 10.81 
39172 1  26.81 
14583 7.02 
1 106 .352 
4070 3 . 1 8  
7 8  .763 
1 1043 8.34 
169 .586 
2673 1 1.01 
12468 34.41 
1 76 1  6.52 
3098 6.26 
2787 6.54 
2 1 7  .365 
5526 8.63 
68394 7 1 .56 
1 1 523 9.38 
9566 9. 1 9  
2 2 1 3  1 .92 
1 2  .00 
1 1.563 8.96 
1420 1 . 80 
1 0 1 5  2.47 
3736 6.66 
Table 20 
Median price in round 5 and number of times a company was undersubscribed 
for com1>anies not fully subscribed before round 5 
Mcdiun Relative Median Median Median 






5 7 1  
Unconditional 1 236 
median 
Group l :  Stock undersubscribed l t ime. 
Group 2: Stock undersubscribed 2 t imes. 
Group 3: Stock undcrsubscribed 3 t imes. 
Group 4: Stock undersubscribcd 4 t i mes. 








P5 Round S, NSo NS5 
355 19 1 50.00 . 1 837 
1 0 1755 40.00 1 1082 
84276 14.29 5959 
59606 33.33 3735 
4 1797 33.33 1 0 1 5  
67207 33.33 3736 
Table 21  
Cross-sectional distribution of  price differential for subsample of  stocks 
fully subsclibed before or in roundj-
Unconditional distlibution 
N Min Ql Median Mean QJ Max 
All 295 -75.0 - 1 6.68 -7. 1 4  - 1.42 -2. 3 1  950 
Conditional distribution: conditional on round 
Round N Min Ql Median Mean QJ Max 
1 48 -33.33 · 1 6.62 -1 6.67 - 1 7.0 1 - 1 6.62 - 1 6.62 
2 73 -35.72 - 1 0.72 -7. 1 4  -5.73 .00 1 50.00 
3 53 -75.00 - 1 6.62 -4. 1 3  5.60 . 00  300.00 
4 8 1  -66.67 -25.00 - 1 0.00 7.74 -2.84 950.00 









Note: The price di1Tercnual is compu1ed as t he difference between the price of a stock in the round in 
which i t  becomes fully subscnbed and 1he median price in round 5 of a control group of 
companies with similar rclJll\'e dcm.111d 1 11 round I ;  I 0 groups of equal size are formed. 
Table 22 
The price-updating rule after rou nd 1 
Shun Outst. RelaU� Demand In Round 1, # Shares Left Repricing Relative # Shares Leet Price Sample Size, before Round 1 ,  DI after Round 1 ,  Factor after Price In Demand In aner Round 2, # N Median, Median, Round 1 ,  Round 2, ·Round 2, Median, NS0 NS1 Rz P2 Median, NS2 Dz 
Min Mu Median 
I .. ·�197 .oo.i .094 .0 17 146322 .30 10.00 . 124 105769 2 I U  141111(1) .030 . 192 .062 79309 .33 1 1 .1 1 .256 59587 J I )4 11022 . 1 00  . 1 99 . 144 70544 .38 12.50 .380 43052 4 471 7977 1 .200 .9 33 .4 1 2  42040 .43 14.29 1 . 1 9  26106 � I J  I I  :1696 .672 .860 .689 33856 .50 16.67 3.45 33856 6 19 611 2\6 .691 1 . 1 3  .7 1 9  19434 .60 20.00 3.46 18579 7 !.� \61 171 .n � I 19 .761 1 3406 .75 25.00 3.07 1 2699 II .&l 1 7 17 • .7K I I 05 .828 6548 I .OD 33.33 2.17 4939 9 6 1'J!\6 I 09 1 . 1 6  1 . 14 29256 1 . 1 3  37.50 .9 1 2  8492 10 17 Jl7!0 I 1 9  1 .50 1 .24 32720 1 .20 40.00 .780 14053 I I  n 76716 128 1 .54 1 .36 76776 1.29 42.86 .749 16775 1 2  94 6'1794 .89 3.24 1 .56 43946 1.50 50.00 .808 9077 1 3  l� ) 1 9� 1 .7 3 2.01 1 .86 3 1 954 1.80 60.00 .610 16702 1 4  l� 61 1 \.1 2.0 1 2.79 2.18 67334 2.00 66.67 .725 15784 1 5  -'6 1 1�9'1 2.27 3.44 2.52 27599 2.25 75.00 .746 7695 16 67 52033 .92 6.93 3.38 39964 3.00 100.00 .609 14587 17 45 635115 3.22 5.74 4.66 63585 4.50 150.00 .488 29755 18 32 29 1 78 .95 8.3 1 6.06 939 1 6.00 200.00 .556 6189 19 14 1 8437 8.79 24.32 1 1.47 18437 9.00 300.00 .558 10993 20 2 2725 44.63 145.40 95.01 2725 12.00 400.00 2.93 2725 
Unconditional r = 1 .443 7 1 301 .004 145.40 .514 49034 - 14.29 .714 30122 median 
I 
Note: The price in round 2 is equal to the repricing factor times the price in round l; the latter is 33.33 points for all companies. 
Table 23 
The price-updating rule after round 2: 
summary statistics on price, demand, and number of shares 
Round l Round 2 
Share• Relative Relative Rel alive Share• SIUOple Price Relative Relative Relative Shares 
Group 1.en Demand Demand Demand Lell Size Demand Demand Demand Left 
before Min Max Aller Min. Max, after 
Median Median Median Median Median Median 
2.1 3 4 8 3 3  1 .0 1  1 45 .40 1 . 70 32327 8 2  60.00 1 .0 1  6 . 1 1  1 .20 2 3 5 8  
2.2 59670 .0 1 3  999 . 5 46 2 5 1 24 43 1 1 4 .29 1 .0 0  1 3.94 2 . 1 3  2 1 3 8 1  
2.3 7 1 23 4  3.0 1 1 7 . 5 3  4 . 3 3  7 1 234 7 3  1 50 . 00 . 1 3  . 9 1 5  .457 39326 
2.4 1 347 1 4  1 . 1 9 2.98 1 .6 2  1 347 1 4  1 27 50.00 . 1 0  .969 .604 45000 
2.5 2 34 1 5 .09 24.32 1 . 40 1 7 896 248 5 0.00 . 1 7  .996 .752 4 5 1 6  
2.6 1 1 0438 .004 .607 . 1 02 96752 4 8 2  1 2 .SO . 0 1  . 906 .263 . 607 9 1  
Unconditional 7 1 30 1  .004 1 4 5 . 4 0  . 5 1 4  49034 = 1443 1 4.29 .O l l  1 3.94 . 7 1 4  3 0 1 22 
Round 3 Round 4 
Sample Repricing Prke Reial Ive Shares Sample Repricing Price Relative Share1 
Group Siu Faclor Demand un Size Factor Demand Len Aner Aner 
Median Median Median Median Median Median Median Median 
2. 1 49 1 . 33 1 00 . 00 . 5 7 0  566 47 1 .00 1 00.00 .506 1 29 
2.2 3 9 1  2.33 33.33 .409 1 0028 3 8 1  1 .00 3 3 . 3 3  .379 5 800 
2.J 7 3  ! . 00 200.00 .249 27707 6 8  .66 1 00.00 . 4 1 0  1 1 3 1 4  
2.4 1 2 7 .44 2 5 .00 I .S O  32350 1 1 5 1 .00 2 5 .00 1 . 0 1  9326 
2.5 2 4 8  2 .00 1 00 . 00 . 2 8 5  2 6 7 5  2 4 9  1 .00 1 00.00 . 2 39 1 920 
2 .6 4 8 2  . 2 37 2 94 1 .90 47983  462 1 .56 s .oo 1 . 1 8  2 1 1 7 5  
(lntondllion1I 
= 1 370 - 2 5 .00 .769 1 9640 
= 
1 3 1 7  - 25 .00 698 9 1 90 
lluund 5 
Sam pit Repridnit ..... .  Relativ. Share• 
G roup Siu Farlor Demand 1 ... n Aller 
Median Median Mtd1an Mrd1an 
2. 1 4 4  1 . 00 1 00 00 . 426  8 4 
2.2 3 7 5  1 .00 H J J  . 3 4.1  3 1 90 
2.3 6 7  1 .00 I UO 00 . 3 5 1J  7 H 5 4  
2 . 4  9 6  J . 5 0  40 0 0  .5 2 5 n62 
2.s 2 3 8 1 . 00 J ou 00 2'-'" I l04 
2.6 4 1 6  I . SO  7 6Y I '" \ 1 1 7 M  
l'nt.....thlon1I 
• 1 1 �  - " " 0 '1  I Y 7 f, 
Now Grour 2 1  Oll 
Grour 2.2 OU 
Grour 2 .l :  OU w1lh l>l > J aflcr n111Dd I 
Oroup 2.4 OU wilh n1 l J aflcr round I 
Group 2 .5 :  OU or Ul.1 wllh wnall k-n••vcn 
Group 2.6: uu 
The fil'll leller rtfm to tM sul>"nplu•o 11.1100 on niunJ I , 011 · 1. ;anJ tht 1otcnnd letler to lhe sul>scription status in round 2. 
